The month of September is indeed a rich one for Arab historians wanting to write up a 'Today in History'. September 28 alone has recorded several monumental events that have shaped modern Arab history: the break-up of the Syrian-Egyptian Union in 1961, the death of Jamal Abdul Nasser in 1970, the signing of Oslo II in 1995, and the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000. September of course, is when the horrific 9-11 terrorist attacks took place in 2001, when the Sabra and Shatila massacres occurred in 1982 and when the original Oslo Accords were signed on the White House lawn in 1993. Editorials throughout the Arab press are filled with commentary on what September means to the Arabs.
A London-based Saudi daily ran a front-page story titled "September the Future" regarding the opening of the King Abdullah University for Science and Technology, the first co-ed university in Saudi Arabia. Unlike most Arabs, the Saudis were looking forward, not back. The Syrian press preferred to write about the coup d'etat that brought down the United Arab Republic 48 years ago, emphasising that they are still committed to Arab unity. The Palestinian papers delved into Sabra and Shatila, once again asking why then Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon was never brought to justice for his crimes. Twenty-six years later, his successor Ehud Olmert is standing trial for corruption.
While most of these events are of historical significance, what matters today to the Middle East is Oslo II, formally the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed 14 years ago in Washington, D.C. Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the accords along with Palestinian Liberation Organisation chairman Yasser Arafat, witnessed by US president Bill Clinton and representatives of Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Norway, and the EU. The 1995 agreement became the reference point for subsequent negotiations that led to the Hebron Protocol of 1997, the Wye River Memorandum of 1998, and George W. Bush's ill-fated Road Map in 2002. For all practical purposes, the agreement's five chapters, 31 articles, seven annexes and nine maps have all been consigned to history.
Political science students in 2009 refer to Oslo II as an historical event, while those of us working in the field still remember it vividly. Arafat defended it aggressively, telling his critics that Oslo and Oslo II restored Palestine to the world map, challenging a 1968 statement by Israeli prime minister Golda Meir that "The Palestinians do not exist". Oslo and Oslo II, Arafat argued, proved to Meir and all his enemies that the Palestinians did indeed exist and were still visible to the rest of the world. In his newly released book, Innocent Abroad, former US ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk recalls that when landing at St Andrews Air Force Base after many years of being called a terrorist by the US, Arafat embraced then-Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar Bin Sultan and, unable to hide his excitement, smiled and shouted, "Andrews, Bandar! We are at Andrews!"
Arafat was seemingly stunned by how much his fortunes had changed, having been shunned by the international community for his embrace of Saddam Hussain during the Gulf War of 1991. Here he was, with Palestinian flags fluttering in the breeze, being recognised as a world statesman and peacemaker.
I still recall how Arafat went to great lengths on television, speaking in English, to try and explain to audiences what Oslo II was all about. A complex and extensive document, its most important breakthrough was recognising the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Government Authority, and an elected Palestinian Council, with 82 representatives, dealing with civil affairs and the transfer of power from Israel to the Palestinians. The agreement called for the redeployment of the Israel Defence Forces beyond Gaza and Jericho, the establishment of the Palestinian Police in the West Bank and the Strip. This was to be the 'second redeployment' and would be followed by a third, a withdrawal from all rural areas. The new Palestinian Authority was given control of Nablus, Kalkilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin and Hebron. In 'Area B', designated by the agreement, the Palestinians would get control of 450 towns and villages in the West Bank, while Israel would maintain overriding security authority, ostensibly "to combat terrorism". Oslo II also introduced the concept of safe passage for Palestinians wanting to travel between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
There was one catch, which Arafat reluctantly accepted: "The provisions of this Agreement shall not prejudice Israel's right, for security and safety considerations, to close the crossing points to Israel and to prohibit or limit the entry into Israel of persons and of vehicles from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip".
Looking back 14 years later, we can safely conclude that Oslo II was sunk by two players - Sharon and Hamas - which categorically refused to recognise any agreement between the Palestinians and Israel. Sharon said no to the agreement from day one. Ironically, however, Hamas was elected to power after Arafat's death and became part of the political process that was established at Oslo. If it were not for Oslo II, the Palestinians would not have Gaza, and had that not happened, Hamas would not have taken over the strip in 2007.
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