

Motivation or Capabilities? Israeli Counterterrorism against Palestinian Suicide Bombings and Violence

Hillel Frisch

The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies

The BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University was founded by Dr. Thomas O. Hecht, a Canadian Jewish community leader. The Center is dedicated to the memory of Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who concluded the first Arab-Israel peace agreement. The Center, a non-partisan and independent institute, seeks to contribute to the advancement of Middle East peace and security by conducting policy-relevant research on strategic subjects, particularly as they relate to the national security and foreign policy of Israel.

Mideast Security and Policy Studies serve as a forum for publication or re-publication of research conducted by BESA associates. Publication of a work by BESA signifies that it is deemed worthy of public consideration but does not imply endorsement of the author's views or conclusions. *BESA Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy* summarize the papers delivered at conferences and seminars held by the Center, for the academic, military, official and general publics. In sponsoring these discussions, the BESA Center aims to stimulate public debate on, and consideration of, contending approaches to problems of peace and war in the Middle East. *A listing of recent BESA publications can be found at the end of this booklet.*

International Advisory Board

Founder of the Center and Chairman of the Advisory Board: Dr. Thomas O. Hecht

Members: Prof. Moshe Arens, Mrs. Neri Bloomfield, Mrs. Madeleine Feher, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Ms. Marion Hecht, Mr. Robert Hecht, Hon. Shlomo Hillel, Sir Robert Rhodes James, Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Mr. Robert K. Lifton, Maj. Gen. (res.) Daniel Matt, Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, Maj. Gen. (res.) Ori Orr, Mr. Seymour D. Reich, Amb. Meir Rosenne, Hon. Yitzhak Shamir, Lt. Gen. (res.) Dan Shomron, Amb. Zalman Shoval, Amb. Norman Spector, Dr. Aldophe Steg, Mr. Muzi Wertheim

International Academic Advisory Board

Desmond Ball *Australian National University*, Ian Beckett *University of Northampton*, Eliot A. Cohen *SAIS Johns Hopkins University*, Irwin Cotler *McGill University*, Steven R. David *Johns Hopkins University*, Yehezkel Dror *Hebrew University*, Lawrence Freedman *King's College*, Patrick James *University of Southern California*, Efraim Karsh *King's College*, Robert J. Lieber *Georgetown University*, Barry Posen *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, Jasjit Singh *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*

Research Staff

BESA Center Director: Prof. Efraim Inbar

Senior Research Associates: Dr. Zeev Bonen, Prof. Stuart A. Cohen, Dr. Gil Feiler, Dr. Jonathan Fox, Dr. Hillel Frisch, Prof. Eytan Gilboa, Dr. Rami Ginat, Eng. Aby Har-Even, Prof. Arye L. Hillman, Dr. Avi Kober, Dr. Zeev Maghen, Prof. Amikam Nachmani, Amb. Itzhak Oren, Prof. Shmuel Sandler, Dr. Dany Shoham, Dr. Shlomo Shpiro, Dr. Max Singer, Prof. Gerald Steinberg

Research Associates: Dr. Tsilla Hersheo, Dr. Mordechai Kedar, Dr. Jonathan Rynhold, Dr. Ron Schleifer

Director of Public Affairs: David Weinberg

Program Coordinator: Hava Waxman Koen

Production Editor (English): Tamara Sternlieb

Production Editor (Hebrew): Alona Briner Rozenman

Motivation or Capabilities?
Israeli Counterterrorism against Palestinian Suicide Bombings and Violence

Hillel Frisch

Is it really true that counterterrorism leads to aimless and repetitive conflict as many scholars claim? Mia Bloom in a well-cited article argues that Israeli counterterrorism motivated the Palestinian factions to increase terrorism and the support insurgents receive from wider society: "Surprisingly enough, Israelis rallied around the extreme right, thinking that hawkish policies would deter future attacks. In fact, the long-term ramifications on the Palestinian polity will encourage rather than deter future attacks."¹ Elsewhere in the article, Bloom is even more disparaging about Israeli offensive measures to reduce Palestinian terrorism: "The Israelis and Palestinians appear to be in a dead-locked battle of assassination-suicide bombing-assassination-suicide bombing in an unending causal loop... encouraging yet more 'martyrs.'"² She concludes, "...in the long run, the number of attacks will increase because groups vying to lead the Palestinians will use violence as their main source of recruitment and mobilization."³

Bloom is hardly alone in focusing on the motivation of the insurgent as being crucial in explaining the intensity of violence and in questioning the presumed effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorist

Hillel Frisch is Senior Lecturer of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University. The author would like to thank Jonathan Fox, Efraim Inbar, Stuart Cohen and an anonymous reviewer for their comments and the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) for funding the project.

actions. According to Scott Atran, "repeated suicide actions show that massive counterforce alone does not diminish the frequency or intensity of suicide attacks."⁴ Even Richard Boucher, then State Department spokesperson under the hawkish Bush administration doubted the value of Israel's offensive moves, primarily targeted killings, when he stated in July 2001 that "Israel needs to understand that targeted killings of Palestinians don't end the violence, but are only inflaming an already volatile situation and making it much harder to restore calm."⁵

If counterterrorism indeed breeds more violence because it increases motivation amongst the insurgents in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as Bloom and others predicted, why then did suicide attempts decline from its peak in 2003-2004 by over one-third (from 184 to 119 attempts) and successful suicide attacks decrease by over 40 percent (from 26 to 15)? Even more dramatically, why did the number of Israeli fatalities from suicide bombing and other forms of Palestinian violence drop by 75 percent (!) from its peak in 2002 within two years, leading, as the paper will demonstrate, to a turn-around in the Israeli economy?

The following article claims that it is not motivation amongst the insurgents that counts militarily or politically as much as their organizational capabilities. These are largely determined by the opponent's counterterrorism moves. More specifically, this paper sets out to demonstrate the validity of the following four claims:

- 1) That Palestinian violence declined dramatically since its peak in 2002.
- 2) That none of the competing explanations identifying motivation as the chief cause of the intensity and efficiency of the Palestinian insurgency - relative deprivation, vengeance, outbidding or motivation to spoil a peace process - sufficiently explain the decline in both the intensity and efficiency of Palestinian violence.
- 3) That a reduction of Palestinian capabilities was at stake.
- 4) And that the reduction in these capabilities was directly linked to successful Israeli counterterrorism.

Even if Israeli offensive moves, such as the killing of the two Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and his successor Abd al-Aziz al-Rantissi in March and April 2004 increased the desire to engage in terrorism, Hamas and the other factions battered by Israel, were forced to operate at reduced level of efficiency. Eventually they were induced to unilaterally accept the *tahdiyya* (lull) in the fighting in March 2005, vindicating the argument that the insurgent's capabilities are far more important than motivation in explaining the damage wrought to the Israeli side or the political dividends achieved, and that these capabilities are largely determined by successful counterterrorism measures. By reducing Palestinian terrorism, Israel was able to stop the contraction of its economy, a potentially macro-strategic threat, and to rebound economically.

The paper begins with a review of the literature assessing the importance of motivation relative to capabilities. It then proceeds to analyze the basic trends regarding Palestinian violence and its efficiency both in terms of the casualties the organizations suffered in carrying them out and the damage wrought to the Israeli side. To what extent motivation explains the decline in Palestinian terrorism is covered in the third part. The fourth section looks at how Israeli counterterrorism measures, mainly denying a sanctuary for Palestinian insurgents in Judea and Samaria, affected the insurgent's organizational capabilities.

Capabilities, Motivation and Terrorism

"Our revenge will come a hundredfold for the blood of Rantissi and Yassin." promised a Hamas official after the killing of the two Hamas leaders in April 2004."⁶

Though vengeance questionably might be the major rhetorical and propaganda device used by the terrorists themselves, psychological factors related to deprivation are often identified as the key reasons for collective violence. According to Attran "rising aspirations followed by dwindling expectations particularly regarding civil liberties are critical factors in generating support for suicide terrorism."⁷

Vengeance, tit-for-tat dynamics and escalation have been suggested by Barry Weingast and Rui de Figueiredo, who have argued that violence is often retaliatory. Palestinian suicide bombings are closely linked to Israeli actions: the massacre at the al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron by an Israeli settler that killed over 30 worshipers in 1994, the opening of the tunnel beneath the western wall of the Temple Mount in 1996 that led to week-long clash between Israel and Palestinian security forces, and targeted assassinations of Palestinian terrorist commanders such as Hamas engineer Yahya Ayyash in early 1996.⁸

If Weingast and de Figueiredo perceive terrorism and suicide-bombing in particular as being motivated by vengeance, Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter emphasize rationality in proposing that terrorism is largely used by the Palestinian opposition, Hamas and the Jihad al-Islami, as a means to spoil the prospects of peace negotiations just as they seem most probable and promising.⁹ Terrorism makes the moderates on the Palestinian side seem weak, generating doubt among Israeli negotiators that political concessions will not bring the important dividends of peace and calm, thus reducing their motivations to conclude a deal with the Palestinian side.

For Pape, suicide bombing is also rational aimed not necessarily at spoiling peace processes but in achieving strategic gains, primarily the withdrawal of foreign forces from contested territory. He cites numerous examples: the withdrawal of American and French military forces from Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces from Lebanon in 1985, (more questionably) Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995, and the Sri Lankan government's willingness to create an independent Tamil state from 1990.¹⁰

Another explanation for the increase in suicide bombing agrees that it is rational but disagrees with the source of that motivation. According to Bloom, violent organizations are not motivated strategically by the external arena as much as they are by the desire to outbid domestic rivals and increase their popularity on the home front. Hamas and the Jihad al-Islami, Bloom argues, used suicide-bombing in the recent wave of conflict to challenge the political hegemony of Fatah.¹¹

Not all scholars agree with the overwhelming focus on terrorist motivation reflected in recent literature.¹² Instead, many scholars focus on the effects and outcomes of terrorism and the reasons for its reduction or augmentation. Sandler and Arce's most recent work, in sharp contrast to the ideas expressed in the opening of this article, suggest that governments may be in error of favoring defensive counterterrorist measures over offensive policies, especially when terrorists direct a disproportionate number of attacks at one government. Even though offensive policies tend to provide public benefits to all potential targets, they are not as extensively employed as less effective and more costly defensive measures.¹³

Strong offensive measures are also suggested in an article by Arreguin-Toft. He tries to understand why in guerrilla warfare or low intensity conflict there is a growing tendency (over the past two centuries) for the weaker side to win. He concludes much like Sandler and Arce - though on the basis of inductive rather than deductive analysis of historical data - that strong states should escalate conflict in the form of direct offensive attacks against the guerrillas in order to prevail.¹⁴ In a similar vein, Weyland points out that the tough offensive-minded counterterrorism in Peru was very effective.¹⁵ These scholars would argue that responding forcefully and escalating the conflict in response to terrorist attacks do not create senseless tit-for-tat or loop-like processes but are likely to lead to reduced capabilities amongst the insurgents, to fewer human and material resources at their disposal, and finally, to reduced and less effective terrorism.

More specifically in the Israeli-Arab and Palestinian arena, Sprecher and Derouen note that in the context of interstate warfare, Arab military actions appear to have been driven by Israeli military actions. These Arab actions seem to decrease in response to Israeli actions, suggesting the effectiveness of Israeli offensive measures.¹⁶ Steven David was one of the few to predict the effectiveness of Israeli offensive moves at the peak of Palestinian suicide bombings, when he predicted that Israeli targeted killing would erode terrorist infrastructure over time.¹⁷ Sergio Catignani acknowledges Israeli counterterrorism but claims that it comes at the expense of long-term strategic thinking.¹⁸ Israelis, in his view, expend far too much effort in

scoring tactical points in the conflict with the Palestinians and too little on how to achieve macro-strategic goals.

Similarly, Bruce Hoffman looks at the U.S. side of countering terrorism. In a specially prescient article published in 1994, Hoffman warned that the "revolution in military affairs" focusing on conventional and ballistic warfare would have little if any impact on American military capabilities in countering terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare motivated by a religious imperative unless the United States military began expending greater resources and mind power to modifying its force structure and techniques to counterterrorism.¹⁹

This article sides with the latter analysts by claiming that Israeli counterterrorism, which decreased Palestinian capabilities, was more important in explaining *the actual effects of terrorism* than factors related to the insurgent's motivation. Plotting trends in Palestinian violence in the low intensity conflict between Israel and the Palestinians since 2000 is an essential exercise to compare the salience of Israeli moves compared to Palestinian motivation.

Measuring the Cost of Palestinian Violence

Overall, Palestinian violence between September 2000 - March 2005 when all the major Palestinian factions accepted a "lull" (*tahdiyya*) in the fighting increased sharply in the first two years before declining precipitously in 2003 and 2004. The sharpness of this rise and subsequent decline depends on the phenomenon being measured. It was most dramatic in those measures that assessed the costs to the Israeli side. Looking at Israeli fatalities over the years, there was a surge of deaths in 2001, a dramatic peak of fatalities in 2002 (when Israeli deaths nearly doubled), followed by a drop of more than fifty percent in 2003 and once again a fifty percent decline in the subsequent year. Thus, Israeli fatalities (and casualties) were reduced from 452 fatalities in 2002 to 112 in 2004, a 75 percent reduction (See Table 1).

Table 1: Israeli Fatalities of Palestinian Violence in Gaza, West Bank and Israel

Year	Gaza	West Bank	Israel	Total
2000	11	32	4	47
2001	10	95	102	207
2002	25	196	231	452
2003	18	75	121	214
2004	38*	18	56	112
2005	15	14	24	53

* Including two deaths in Israel as a result of Qassam rocket attacks from Gaza
Source: Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000,
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm>.

Plotting the total number of terrorist attacks rather than Israeli casualties produces a similar curve. Terrorist acts peaked at 7,634 in 2001, declined to 5,176 in 2002 (when Israeli casualties soared) and declined once again to 3,941 in 2003. It is interesting to note that there was only a slight increase in terrorist acts from 2003-2004 (3,841 to 3,941), despite the assassinations of Yassin and Rantissi.²⁰

Regarding suicide bombings and attacks specifically, the type of curve depends on whether one is counting all attempted attacks, successful attacks and fatalities. When looking at the data in terms of the costs of Palestinian suicide attacks on Israel, it is remarkably similar to the pattern of Israeli fatalities as a result of all forms of terrorism. The data notes that there was a surge of successful suicide attempts from 2000–2002 (4 to 35 to 60), followed by a sharp decline in the two subsequent years to only 15 successful attacks in 2004 (marking a 75 percent drop from the peak in 2002 and less than one-half the successful suicides carried out in 2001).

Almost exactly the same inverted u-curve appears when plotting fatalities as a result of suicide bombings. There was a very sharp rise from 2001 to 2002 (from 85 to 220 fatalities), followed by a sharp drop in the subsequent two years to 55 fatalities by 2004. Again, one

sees a 75 percent reduction in fatalities from suicide bombings at its peak two years later.

Over time, diminishing effectiveness of Palestinian attacks led to declining motivation. Measuring all attempted suicide attacks, there was a peak in 2003 with 210 attempts, until there was a decline in 2004 to 134 attempts. The number of attempted suicide acts in 2004 was still nearly three times the number of attempts made in 2001 with 55 attempts. By 2005, however, it was down to 22. All in all, there was a marked drop in terrorist activity and a much sharper drop in damage to Israel wrought by Palestinian violence. This is true for violence in general and most of the specific forms of violence employed.

Palestinian insurgency did not only cost lives but had a major economic impact on Israel. For the first time since the 1948 war, hostilities and war led to an absolute contraction of the Israeli economy.²¹ In the 1948 war, the contraction lasted only one year, but during the current hostilities it has continued for over two years. Because of large-scale violence within the green line, Israel was transformed from a fast-growing country (in 2000, the GDP increased eight percent, double the world average) to one characterized by absolute contraction during the first two years of the conflict when Israeli casualties from Palestinian violence reached its height (See Table 3). The effects were even more dramatic when measured on a per capita basis, with per capita GDP dropping more than six percent from 2000–2002 (\$18,358 to \$17,359 US dollars). (See Table 2).

Table 2: Israeli Economic Performance 2000-2004 and the World Economy

World	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
GDP growth (annual %)	4	1	2	3	4
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	3	0	1	2	3
Israel	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
GDP growth (annual %)	8	-0	-1	1	4
GDP per capita (constant 2000 \$US)	18,358	17,868	17,395	17,298	17,752
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	5	-3	-3	-1	3

Source: *World Development Indicators* database

To be sure, some of the downturn could be attributed to the global market crisis the high-tech sector faced towards the end of 2000. This in turn led to a downturn in the world economy. As indicated in the table below, GDP world growth slowed from four to one percent. One can safely assume that the crisis of the high-tech market probably had an even greater impact on Israel. The high-tech crisis alone could hardly explain the variance between performance of the world economy and the absolute stagnation of the Israeli economy in 2001 and its three percent contraction on a per-capita basis compared to zero growth in the world economy. Such trends could explain even less why Israel's economy worsened in 2002 compared to 2001 when the world economy began to improve. While the world economy stabilized in 2001 and grew by two percent in the subsequent year, the Israeli economy continued to contract in 2002. The discrepancy was greater on a per capita basis, with Israeli per capita income declining by 3 percent in 2001-2002 and continued to decline in 2003 as well. Clearly, the devastating impact of terrorism was related to where it took place. If previously, Israel managed to contain the violence to the periphery or even to enemy territory, since 2000, most of the casualties of terrorism occurred against civilians within Israel. This was especially true of suicide bombings: between 2000 and the end of 2005, 86 percent of Israeli fatalities were civilian and the overwhelming percentage of casualties (89 percent) took place within the green line.²²

Gauging Palestinian Capabilities in Waging Violence

Palestinian organizations, judging from survey polls and data relating to violence, were highly motivated to engage in suicide bombings and other forms of lethal violence throughout the period between September 2000 and most of 2004. The problem was not a lack of motivation cited in the literature, but declining capabilities that led to reduced damage on the Israeli side.

Plotting capability of any organization of war involves various measures of attrition and success. The ratio between killed among one's ranks and those of the enemy is one such indicator. A worsening of the ratio is most likely to increase demoralization and recruitment amongst one's own ranks and increase morale and resolve on the other side. Attrition is also related to the insurgent's ability to replace the loss of successful combat leaders and fighters. Rapid loss is likely to hurt the organization's capabilities.²³

Morale and *mobilization* are beyond a doubt important elements in any attempt to sustain organized violence. So is *effectiveness*. Violent organizations are no different than business firms who seek maximum sales at minimum cost. The ratio between operations and casualties inflicted on the other side should be a suitable indicator.

Even as Israeli fatalities were rising, the Palestinians were already showing declining capabilities. Terrorist attacks peaked at 7,634 in 2001, declined to 5,176 in 2002 when Israeli casualties soared and declined once again to 3,941 in 2003.²⁴ If one compares the ratio between total acts of Palestinian violence to Israeli fatalities, that is to say *the effects* of Palestinian violence on the Israeli side, Palestinian overall efficiency peaked radically in 2002 (.09 fatality per act of violence), declined in 2003 (.05) and plummeted in 2004 (.03), roughly the efficiency rate of 2001.

Table 3: Measuring the Effectiveness of Suicide Bombings

Year	Failed Suicides	Successful Suicides	Total Suicide Attempts	Fatalities	Ratio of Successful to Failed Suicides	Ratio of All Suicide Events to Israeli Fatalities
2000	0	4	4	0		
2001	20	35	55	85	1.80	1.6
2002	112	60	172	220	0.50	1.3
2003	184	26	210	142	0.14	0.7
2004	119	15	134	55	0.13	0.4
2005	15	7	22	23	0.47	1.1

Source: *Palestinian Terrorism in 2005*, available at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/palestinian_terror_e.pdf. Pp. 20-22.

Though the incidence of total suicide operations (attempted as well as successful), was slightly different from the incidence of overall terrorist acts, with the number of suicide operations increasing in 2003, the efficiency of these operations reveals striking similarities to the pattern of overall terrorism. Both the ratio of successful to failed suicides as well as the ratio to all suicide events to fatalities peaked in 2001, declined precipitously in 2002 and then dropped further in 2003 and 2004. There was a drop in the efficiency of suicide bombing by 75 percent from 1.6 fatalities to attempted suicide bombing in 2001 to 0.4 fatalities in 2004 (See Table 2). In 2005, mostly after the lull, there was a radical drop in the number of attempted and successful suicides. The killing power of suicide bombing increased once again in 2004 as both attempted and successful bombings decreased in 2004, indicating that a more selective and discriminating policy on the part of the militant groups leads to greater efficiency. It also suggests that terrorism in the absence of negotiations and settlement can perhaps be reduced to the level at which a state and society can cope but not be entirely eliminated.

One of the major indications of the growing human costs borne by Palestinian organizations is the increasing number of top military and political personnel lost from Israeli targeted killings. These took the form of Israeli surgical attacks from the air (mostly in Gaza) and by undercover special forces operating in Judea and Samaria after the

two offensives allowed Israeli forces to enter Palestinian localities at will. As a recent study demonstrates, while suicide bombers were usually peripheral in the organization to which they were recruited, this was the hardly the case of those targeted by Israelis, the overwhelming percentage of whom were not only considered key operatives in the organization by the Israelis but typically acknowledged as such by the Palestinian organizations themselves after they were killed.²⁵ Rarely did the Palestinians accuse the Israelis of hitting “the wrong man”. To the contrary, biographical and eulogizing material often enhanced the terrorist's importance to the organization beyond Israeli justifications for targeting him.

According to a Palestinian source, there were 209 targeted killings until the end of 2004.²⁶ Though targeted killings reached their peak in 2002, with 78 Palestinians assassinated just as the effectiveness of Palestinian terrorism reached its height, Israel continued to pursue this means as the effectiveness of Palestinian terrorism declined in a manner hardly commensurate with that decline. Thus, if from 2003 to 2004 fatalities from Palestinian terror declined by 36 percent, the number of those killed as a result of targeted killing declined by less than four percent (from 57 to 55 targeted killings). This relentlessness to employ targeted killing also indicates the growing asymmetry between Israeli military and intelligence capabilities which improved compared to Palestinian capabilities which declined. Even after the lull, Israel was reluctant to give up targeted killing and though the number of Palestinians assassinated declined appreciably in 2005 (from 55 to 33), the decline in total Israeli fatalities was appreciably greater (from 115 to 54).²⁷

Table 4: Israeli Targeted Killing 2000-2005

Year	Targeted Killings
2000	9
2001	31
2002	78
2003	57
2004	55
2005	33

Source: List of Palestinians who were assassinated during the al-Aqsa Intifada, http://www.phrmg.org/aqsa/list_of_assassination_english.htm.

The Effect of Palestinian Motivation on Palestinian Violence

Two questions arise from the brief survey of attempted and actual Palestinian violence: 1) Can Palestinian motivation according to any one of competing theories focusing on motivation, explain the intensity of Palestinian terrorism as described above? 2) Can motivation explain the Palestinians' shrinking capabilities and their effect on the Israeli protagonist?

Least convincing in explaining either the intensity of Palestinian violence or its effectiveness are motivational variables related to frustration and deprivation. One can hardly believe that the collective psychology of Palestinians improved so significantly as to explain such a reduction in terrorist attempts in general and suicide bombings in particular.

Looking at the significant factors influencing the collective well-being of the Palestinians suggest that there should have been a leveling or even an increase in Palestinian violent operations. According to deprivation theory, resentment soars after an improvement in the situation due to rising expectations. The Palestinian economy in 2003 had improved by six percent after the average Palestinian income had dropped by one-third and the overall unemployment rate rose from 11 to 25 percent from 2000 levels before the outbreak of widespread violence.²⁸ It worsened once again

in 2004. According to the theory, 2004 should have been characterized by an increase in attempted violence. Nor did employment in Israel and the settlements suggest an improvement in the situation to account for why a marked increase in terrorism did not take place. Though employment in Israel had increased after the two offensives in the spring and summer of 2002, it remained constant through mid-2004.²⁹

Nor was Israel's military presence in the West Bank/Judea and Samaria significantly less onerous. Restrictions on movement create anxiety and frustration for Palestinians. However, there was little improvement between 2002 and 2004; 757 barriers restricted Palestinian movement in the West Bank in October 2003, dropping slightly to 719 to November 2004.³⁰ Military forays into Gaza, either into the towns and refugee camps of Rafah and Khan Yunis that were located in proximity to the evacuated Israeli settlements in the Katif bloc in the south, or into the Beit Hanun area in the northern part of the Gaza strip, in fact increased in response to the growing number of rockets launched at Israeli localities within green line Israel. Despite a decline in Palestinian fatalities, they hardly paralleled the decline in attempted and successful suicide bombings, particularly between 2003 and 2004 (See Table 3). The decline in Palestinian fatalities by less than five percent and a similar reduction in restrictions on freedom of movement between 2003-2004 can hardly explain the 36 percent reduction in the total number of suicide attempts during that year.

Table 5: Palestinian Deaths – September 2000 - September 2004

Year of Intifada	Dates	Number Killed
1	Sep.2000- Sep.2001	714
2	Oct.2001- Sep.2002	1,195
3	Oct.2002- Sep.2003	727
4	Oct.2003- Sep.2004	698
Total		3,334

Source:

http://www.palestinemonitor.org/new_web/4_years_intifada_anniversary.htm.

Deprivation theory is even less useful in explaining the effectiveness of Palestinian violence. As noted, Israeli casualties of Palestinian violence had declined by 75 percent by 2004 from its peak in 2002. Palestinian frustration remained constant or perhaps even increased, at least until the death of Arafat in November 2004.

The “spoiler” thesis fares only slightly better in explaining the variation in the intensity of Palestinian violence. Overall Palestinian violence declined from its peak in the spring of 2002 and then stabilized in 2003-2004. Bloom had already critiqued the failure of the explanation during the upsurge of violence when “a significant increase in attacks in March 2002 took place against a political backdrop with few substantive peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority--limiting the explanatory power of the spoiler rationale to explain this phenomenon as a whole.”

According to spoiler thesis, violence, principally by Hamas and the Jihad al-Islami (who objected to any peace process), should have **increased** during the summer of 2002 when, for the first time, President Bush committed the United States to the establishment of a Palestinian state. In September 2002, this commitment became the basis for the Road Map, a peace process undersigned by the United States, the United Nations, the European Community and Russia, which aimed at establishing a Palestinian state within three years. The opposition should have been especially keen on increasing terrorism since the Road Map stipulated the suppression of such activity as a prelude to advancing in the negotiation process.

Political developments within the PA should have spurred the opposition faction, Hamas and the Jihad al-Islami into increasing terrorist attacks and playing the role of spoiler. In September 2003, Arafat bowed to international pressure and agreed to create the new position of prime-minister for Muhammad Abbas, who had been both a serious opponent of violent uprising and an ardent dove. One could claim in defense of the thesis that Abbas was perceived as weak and that therefore terrorist actions would not have harmed the trust of the target government in Abbas, which was very low.³¹

Violent attempts by both Hamas and the Jihad did increase in 2004. In that year, Hamas perpetrated 555 terrorist attacks, compared to 281 in 2003, an almost 200 percent increase. Jihad perpetrated 106 attacks compared to 71 the previous year.³² Some of the increase in attempts at violence by Hamas may have been motivated by vengeance, especially the killing of Hamas leaders, Yassin and Rantissi. Yet, even if the theory credibly explains Palestinian motivation, it hardly accounts for declining performance levels, especially after Arafat's death and the staging of presidential elections in January 2006. Hamas and the Jihad should have been worried about the possibility of a renewed peace process. Instead, they accepted the lull (*tahdiyya*) and Hamas more or less maintained it despite repeated Israeli strikes against Palestinian factions.

The stark increase in attacks in 2003 – 2004 by Hamas and the Jihad are harder to explain in terms of internal competition and outbidding according to the indicators Bloom proposes - support for suicide bombing and the popularity of the factions over time. Regarding the first indicator, support for suicide attacks, there was a slight reduction of support in suicide bombings registered in June 2004 (62 percent) compared to 65 percent in October 2003. This indicator can hardly explain the *increase* in violent attacks by Hamas and the Jihad al-Islami. Nor does the second indicator explain the radical increase. To recall the outbidding argument, factions such as Hamas and Jihad in particular, should have increased suicide attacks during periods of declining popularity. Yet, the popularity (in reality, trust) of Hamas dropped only slightly (from 23.0 percent in 2003 to 21.7 percent in 2004), while the popularity of Jihad remained constant or slightly increased (5 to 5.5 percent).³³

Even more critically, trust in Fatah, the major opponent of Hamas, declined even more than the trust for Hamas (29 to 26.4 percent). In other words, the gap between those trusting Hamas compared to Fatah actually declined, reducing the incentive of Hamas to engage in terror activities in order to outbid its opponent. In any event, neither of these indicators can explain why Hamas terrorist attacks nearly doubled from 2003 to 2004 or why in light of this decline, in support for Fatah, the number of attacks it perpetrated actually declined from 117

in 2003 to 97 in 2004 when the organization should have increased the number of attacks to outbid its opposition on the Right.³⁴

A somewhat related argument that Hamas increased terrorist attacks to assert its predominance in Gaza in light of pending Israeli plans to withdraw from Gaza would hardly be convincing. If that were so, why did Hamas accept the *tahdiyya* six months before Israeli troops were scheduled to withdraw from Gaza?

Vengeance may have been part of the reason for the dramatic increase in attacks by Hamas. It aimed at harming the Israeli economy as well.³⁵

How aware the Palestinian factions were of the economic impact of terrorism is attested by the articles which appeared on the unofficial Hamas internet site. Articles entitled, 'Zionist official says Israel was on verge of economic collapse',³⁶ and 'Zionist writer: Palestinian intifada exhausted us',³⁷ demonstrated the organization's intimate knowledge that terrorism was indeed punishing the Israeli economy. The economic facts during 2002 - 2003 should have motivated the Palestinian movements even more in continuing their offensive against Israel. Yet the effects of Palestinian terrorism began to decrease just as these and other articles were disseminated, suggesting that the decrease was not due to lack of motivation but rather to sharply reduced Palestinian capabilities as a result of effective Israeli offensive and defensive moves against Palestinian organizations.

Denying Sanctuary: Israeli Counterterrorism and Palestinian Capabilities

Analyzing Israeli fatalities on a monthly basis offers one of the most telling indicators of the effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism in reducing Palestinian capabilities (see Table 5). A good example is looking at the period in 2002 when Palestinian terrorism peaked. In terms of the effectiveness of Palestinian violence, the tides turned after the two Israeli offensives conducted in March (Shield) and June 2002 (Determined Path) in areas "A". During these operations, the major West Bank towns under the jurisdiction of the PA were

temporarily reoccupied and then continuously penetrated and policed.³⁸ Palestinian fighters lost any temporary sanctuary they formerly enjoyed as Israeli troops pursued them without respite.

Table 6: Israeli Casualties (Dead and Wounded) October 2001 to September 2002.

	West Bank		Gaza		Israel Proper		Total	
	Dead	Wounded	Dead	Wounded	Dead	Wounded	Dead	Wounded
Oct. 2001	3	5	2	14	10	40	15	59
Nov. 2001	3	2	2	5	8	101	13	108
Dec. 2001	12	27	0	5	26	78	38	110
Jan. 2002	3	2	0	0	13	39	16	41
Feb. 2002	20	40	6	4	5	12	31	56
March 2002	26	30	13	26	91	486	130 135	542
6 month total	67	106	23	54	153	756	243	916
April 2002	33	40	2	8	16	106	51	154
May 2002	6	5	1	0	23	191	30	196
June 2002	9	9	3	4	46	155	58	168
July 2002	16	16	1	0	13	118	30	134
Aug. 2002	4	2	1	0	11	67	16	69
Sept. 2002	6	8	0	0	7	51	13	59
6 month total	74	80	8	12	116	688	198	780

These Israeli offensives allowed a substantial increase in preventive arrests. As long as the total number of detainees increased moderately (from 1,446 detainees in January 2001 to 1,969 the following year, a 36 percent rise), both the incidence of terrorism and the efficiency of suicide bombings increased. When, however, preventive arrests shot up to 2,682 by April 2002, just after the first offensive, and to 4,694 by January 2003, a 128 percent increase within a year, the incidence of Palestinian terrorism began to decline as did the efficiency of suicide bombings, largely because of increased accessibility to the suspects.³⁹

A comparison between violent attacks in the West Bank and Gaza offers an even more striking confirmation of the importance of Israeli offensive and preemptive measures of denying Palestinians a sanctuary. In the West Bank, where Palestinians were denied a sanctuary, terrorists attacks more than halved from 2,089 to 1,025 from 2002 - 2003. The number of attacks dropped to 841 in 2004, just over one-third of the attacks that took place two years earlier. By contrast, in Gaza, where Palestinians enjoyed a continuous yet porous sanctuary, there was almost no decline in the number of attacks from 2002 to 2004 (2,906 to 2,771 attacks).⁴⁰

Comparing Israeli fatalities in the West Bank to those in Gaza between 2002 and 2004 demonstrates in even starker relief the importance of offensive moves and the denial of sanctuary. (See Table 1). Whereas Israeli fatalities declined by over 90 percent during this period from 196 to 18 (!), Israeli losses in Gaza actually increased from 25 to 38 fatalities.

In the short term, not all offensive measures were equally effective. Contrary to expectations of the Israeli military, the use of targeted killing was uniformly distributed between Gaza and the West Bank. Thus, between the outbreak of hostilities and September 2004, 44.8 percent of the targeted killings took place in Gaza, roughly proportional to Gaza's share of the total Palestinian population in Gaza and the West Bank.⁴¹ Nevertheless, violence increased in Gaza and decreased precipitously in the West Bank during this period, indicating that targeted killing cannot explain the variation in trends of violence between these two areas. Daniel Byman, however, suggests that in the long run, targeted killings, especially those directed against the political leadership, have a major effect. After all, Hamas leaders made reaching a ceasefire contingent on stopping targeted killings and then went on to accept a unilateral "lull" even in the face of an escalated Israeli response against Palestinian factions.⁴²

Comparing Offensive to Defensive Measures in Reducing Palestinian Capabilities

Israel, however, did not only react offensively but also hardened its defense. Therefore, it is difficult to decipher if the reduction of

Palestinian capabilities was the result of offensive or defensive measures.

Some of the decline in casualties within Israel could also be the result of defensive measures, principally the building of the barrier in Judea and Samaria. The barrier, though adumbrated by (Israeli) Minister of Police Shahal in 1995,⁴³ reached the construction stage only in the summer of 2002, after Palestinian terrorism reached its zenith. Since the introduction of the plan, all Israeli prime ministers (Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu and Barak, who first introduced the concept of separation) procrastinated in its implementation. Many Israeli politicians, especially on the right, felt that the creation of a continuous barrier would compromise Israel at the negotiating table with the Palestinians.⁴⁴

Work began on the first part of the route, in Salem, the northern most point of the Arab Triangle, an area inhabited within the former armistice line by Israeli Arab Palestinians. The route continued east near Palestinians living under the Palestinian Authority to Elkana, east of the northern reaches of the Dan region, Israel's most populous zone.⁴⁵ The choice to begin with this section of the route (about 100 kilometers in length), as part of a much longer 500 km. project was obvious. Northern Samaria, principally Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarem, were the major centers of terrorist operations, especially suicide bombings, while the inhabitants of Israeli towns closest to the former green line (Netanya and Hadera) were their principle victims.⁴⁶ A further extension running northeast to close off the West Bank from northern Israel was completed in December 2003 creating a barrier between the two towns of Nablus and Jenin who produced the most suicide bombers and the two Israeli towns, Afula and Beit Shean that had suffered several suicide attacks.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, one must note that a greater reduction of fatalities occurred among Israelis living in the West Bank (from 196 deaths in 2002 to 18 in 2004 amounting to 90 percent) where they did not enjoy a continuous barrier with sensors. In comparison, for Israelis living in Israel proper, there was only a 75 percent reduction in fatalities (from 231 to 56), suggesting once again the effectiveness of offensive

actions over defensive ones (See Table 1). As Ben-Israel, Setter and Tishler point out "... it is more important to act against the leadership of terrorist organizations than against the activists in the field, and it is more effective to act against key activists playing a role in producing terrorism than against the terrorists who actually carry it out. By the same principle, it is more effective to prevent a terrorist from entering one's population centers than to attempt to stop him while he is already carrying out his 'mission'." ⁴⁸

Another way of evaluating the relative importance of the fence compared to offensive moves is to compare the number of fatalities and wounded during the period between the two large offensives and the completion of the first part of the fence, from June 2002 to August 2003, with a similar period after the completion of the fence. If the reduction in casualties is greater in the first period before the fence was completed than in the second after the completion of the fence, one can surmise that offensive moves were more effective than the fence. The findings are hardly conclusive: fatalities decreased from 274 deaths in the period of the two large assaults to 107 just before the completion of the fence, a 61.5 percent reduction in the course of the year. In the subsequent year after the building of the permanent barrier it declined from 107 to 42, a 60.1 percent reduction.

Other forms of defensive hardening might have played a role in reducing Palestinian violence. By early 2002, the overwhelming majority of all public institutions and private businesses in predominantly Jewish areas in Israel who directly serviced clientele provided security guards at the entrances to these establishments. ⁴⁹ Such an arrangement, however, could not be imposed on each and every bus. Instead, transportation guards moved from bus to bus and route to route, while mobile car patrols protected the bus-stops. Even less protected are the open spaces -squares or roads - in which the police provide overall protection. One would expect that if such defensive measures were indeed a deterrent, there would be a shift of attacks away from shopping malls, restaurants and other protected spaces to less protected spaces such as buses, and an even greater shift to road attacks and attacks in open spaces over time.

The evidence, however, is far from conclusive; shootings which occurred in less protected spaces declined by 77 percent from 2001 to 1,198 in 2004 (until the end of September 2004) compared to a 75 percent reduction in suicide bombings which usually took place in protected or semi-protected areas.⁵⁰ Nor were there many cases in which attackers were apprehended or obstructed by purely defensive measures such as roadblocks or guards. This meant that once on the road, the attacker was likely to reach his target.

From Suicide-Bombing to Less Effective Qassam Rockets

Forcing the enemy to undertake less effective means of violence is one more indication of the effectiveness of Israel's counterterrorist tactics. As Ender and Sandler's seminal work pointed out over a decade ago, perpetrators of organized violence substitute new techniques of violence to replace those that are no longer efficient.⁵¹

Looking at data regarding the means of violence employed by the Palestinians in Gaza clearly demonstrated that suicide bombings declined in the face of both offensive and defensive measures such as the barrier completed along the green line in Judea and Samaria and Gaza. As suicide bombings became more difficult, Palestinian ballistic and mortar activity increased significantly compared to other means (side bombs, suicide and car bombings, road side shooting). From 2003 to 2004, Qassam rocket attacks increased by nearly 300 percent (from 105 to 309), mortar attacks by nearly 200 percent (from 708 to 1231) with declines registered for other types of violence, most notably the aforementioned decline in attempted suicide bombings and the 40 percent decline in successful suicide attacks (from 26 to 15).⁵²

This substitution came at the expense of effectiveness. Whereas suicide attacks comprised less than one percent of the attacks between 2000 and 2005, they caused nearly half of Israeli fatalities since the outbreak of wide scale violence in 2000 (525 of 1048 fatalities). Qassam rocket and mortar attacks have proved to be appreciably less effective. Over 610 Qassam attacks on Israel within the green line yielded only two fatalities between 2001 and 2004 and eleven in the

following year. Launching Qassams has proved dangerous and costly to the Palestinians themselves; tens of Palestinian fighters have died launching them and others have been killed when they misfire.⁵³ Significantly, all but one Qassam attack has been launched from Gaza where Palestinian insurgents continued to enjoy the benefits of a sanctuary.

Not only were hundreds of Israeli lives saved as a result of Israel's successful offensive against Palestinian terrorism in general and Hamas terrorism in particular, but the offensive operations also proved crucial in stemming continued economic contraction of the Israeli economy. The Israeli economy rebounded only when Israel succeeded to curb the rise of terrorism in 2003, soon followed by a spurt of growth of four percent in absolute terms, and three percent on a per-capita basis in 2004. To recall, in 2004, Israeli casualties more than halved once again.

Short and Medium-Term Gains and Israel's Strategic Problem

In the short run, Israel might have prevailed against the insurgency in persuading most of the Palestinian factions to accept a unilateral lull in February 2005, but in the long run, Israel has far from eradicated Palestinian sources of violence, either militarily or politically. Militarily, the Palestinians have been far less successful in 2005 than in previous wars in waging successful suicide bombings but the effectiveness of these attacks was greater than in the previous year. This suggests that the infrastructure to plan and execute acts of violence to effectively engage much of Israel's standing army remains intact.

Politically, Israel's strategic situation, though arguably much better than during the first stages of Palestinian violence when the United States clearly constrained Israel, remains problematic. The Palestinian Authority's loss of control to favor factions and militias, Muhammad Abbas' failure to exercise the decisive leadership that Arafat clearly possessed in the first years of the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians and the Hamas' assumption to government coupled with its refusal to accept the existence of the Jewish state, has effectively

foreclosed the option of Palestinian statehood. Nor are the prospects very promising of resolving Israel's strategic impasse by "a newly modified Oslo-type agreement or any other political resolution that will end the conflict", as Catignani claimed in a recent article.⁵⁴

In fact, developments since Hamas' rise to power - the growing rivalry between the presidency and the government, the violence between PA security forces loyal to the presidency, mainly Preventive Security in Gaza and the fighting force the Hamas government created, and the in-fighting between Hamas and Fatah - has only reduced the prospects of a Palestinian center able to come to an agreement with Israel, and more critically still, to implement an agreement once signed.⁵⁵ Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's decision to carry out a unilateral withdrawal from Judea and Samaria/the West Bank in addition to the September 2005 Gaza withdrawal is a reflection of this reality.

Yet unilateral withdrawal in the face of a disintegrating Palestinian polity will hardly secure stability especially in the face of increased crude ballistic salvos against towns and localities bordering Gaza and the recent kidnappings after the withdrawal from Gaza. No fewer than 418 Qassams and Katyushas were fired between January and mid-June 2006, compared to 610 over the first three years they were launched (2001-2004).⁵⁶ Unilateral withdrawal from Judea and Samaria/the West Bank runs the risk of creating anew a sanctuary for Palestinian terrorists whose denial in the course of hostilities had a massive impact on reducing Palestinian terrorism.

Nor to date have the bordering states, Egypt and Jordan, seriously contemplated reverting to the roles they played before 1967 in administering the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The prospects are high that areas populated by the Palestinians will become staging grounds for increased future violence.

More broadly, Israel's strategic environment is likely to be more complex than ever before. The inter-state conventional war threat, though seriously reduced since both the demise of the Soviet Union and the removal of Iraq as a potential threat, remains palpable because of Syria. Moreover, the reduced threat in the inter-state

conventional arena has been partially offset by both the growing Iranian nuclear threat to Israel and the increasing Palestinian and Hizballah low-intensity terror and crude ballistic capabilities that would place Israel under a form of perennial rocket siege in the long term.

Optimists would say that though the situation today is more complex, it is hardly as grave as the threat posed from joint action by Israel's bordering states in the 1960s and 1970s. A comparison between the long-term prospects of increasing Palestinian terrorist capabilities coupled with a nuclear Middle East and with Israel's security challenges immediately after Egypt made peace with Israel, might lead to a more pessimistic assessment. Unfortunately, the establishment of a completely sovereign state of Palestine headed by Hamas, even in the face of internal and external opposition, might pose greater dangers than the dangers of terrorism.⁵⁷ At the very least, effective Israeli counterterrorism provides Israel's leaders the respite to tackle political opportunities, if they arise, in the future.

Conclusion

Most of the recent studies on political violence have focused on motivation. This study suggests that capabilities rather than motivation are far more important in explaining both the net effects of Palestinian violence inflicted on the other side and the political losses the Palestinians themselves incurred. Palestinian capabilities were largely dictated by the effective offensive and defensive measures employed by Israel's security forces. Hopefully this paper has demonstrated Israel's increasingly effective counterterrorism campaign leading to declining Palestinian capabilities. The decline occurred despite continuously high motivation levels amongst Palestinians to engage in terror activities in general, and suicide bombings in particular.

Rather than producing a tit-for-tat or loop-like confrontation, Israeli counterterrorism - mainly denying the Palestinians a sanctuary area in the West Bank - has reduced the effects of Palestinian violence considerably. Within two years of the peak level of Palestinian violence, the costs of such violence to the Israeli state and society

dropped by 75 percent. This is hardly a mere statistic. The peak represented an unbearable strain upon a developed economy such as Israel. By 2004, as painful as was the level of casualties on those targeted and their families, it was no longer able to prevent the rebound of the Israeli economy.

Theoretically, the Israeli case shows the robustness of arguments raised by Arreguin-Toft and Sandler and Acre and others that advocate strong offensive measures by the dominant side in asymmetric conflict. Not only have the paper's findings demonstrated the existence of the substitution effect that Sandler and Enders had previously identified (in fact a Hamas publication in Arabic extols its versatility in devising substitutes), but it has also proven true for suicide bombings. Substitution appears when the efficiency of any particular means of violence declines. Suicide bombing was an especially lethal means of violence, so powerful that its effect blinded many scholars studying it. Yet Israel concocted remedies - intelligence, striking at key operatives, massive but surgical preventive arrests, building a continuous barrier - that reduced its efficiency. In this sense, suicide-bombing proved no different from any other terror tactic which is sensitive to overexposure in fighting a superior enemy. Thus far, the substitutes the Palestinians have produced have not proven nearly as lethal as suicide bombings.

This is not to suggest that the war against Palestinian terrorism can be decisively won and that war can be the only form of politics. On the contrary, as the overall intensity and lethality of Palestinian violence in 2005 declined, its efficiency at reduced levels increased. This suggests that only a peace process or Israel's demise can end Palestinian violence. Yet, when such peace seems highly improbable, effective counterterrorism makes the conflict manageable and bearable. This is true not only for the Israeli side but for Palestinians as well since effective counterterrorism also means in the long term more surgical treatment in targeting the foe.

This is a reprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in the Journal of Strategic Studies© October 2006 Copyright Taylor & Francis; the Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 29, Number 5 is available online at <http://journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/openurl.asp?genre=article&issn=0140-2390&volume=29&issue=5&page=843>.

Notes

- ¹ Mia M. Bloom, 'Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding', *Political Science Quarterly* 119/1 (Spring 2004) 80.
- ² Bloom, 'Palestinian Suicide Bombing', 84.
- ³ Bloom, 'Palestinian Suicide Bombing', 87.
- ⁴ Scott Atran, 'Mishandling Suicide Terrorism', *Washington Quarterly* 27/3 (Summer 2004) 67.
- ⁵ Richard Boucher, State Department briefing, 2 July 2001, available at <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2001/4656.htm>> quoted in Gal Luft, 'The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing', *Middle East Quarterly*, 10/1 (Winter 2003) 4.
- ⁶ 'A Volcano of Vengeance - Fury as Israel Assassinate Second Hamas Leader', *The Australian*, April 19, 2004.
- ⁷ Atran, 'Mishandling Suicide Terrorism', 67.
- ⁸ Rui de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, 'Vicious Cycles: Endogenous Political Extremism and Political Violence' (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, September 1998).
- ⁹ H. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, 'Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence', *International Organizations* 56 (Spring 2002) 264.
- ¹⁰ Robert A. Pape, 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism', *American Political Science Review* 97/3 (Aug. 2003) 343-361.
- ¹¹ Bloom, 'Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding', 80.
- ¹² In addition to the articles on motivation already cited, see amongst others Scott Atran, 'Genesis of Suicide Terrorism', *Science* 299 (7 March 2003) 1534-40; Jean Paul Azam, 'Suicide-Bombings as Intergenerational Investment', *Public Choice* 122/1-2 (2005) 201-217; Eli Berman 'Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist View of Radical Religious Militias', National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. w10004, September. (2003), available at <<http://www.nber.org/papers/w10004> (accessed 26 December 2004)>; Claude Berrebi, 'Evidence About the Link between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians', available at <<http://www.cprs-alestine.org/polls/94/poll>. (2003)>; Basel Saleh. 'Economic Conditions and Resistance to Occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: There is a Causal Connection'. (2004), available at <<http://www.mafhoum.com/press7/197E14.htm>; Eyad Sarraj, 'Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope'. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 31/4 (Summer 2002) 71-7; Yoram Schweitzer, 'Suicide Terrorism: Development and Characteristics', lecture presented at the International Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism at ICT, Herzeliya, Israel, February 21, 2000, available at <<http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=112>>; Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill..* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003).
- ¹³ Daniel G Arce and Todd Sandler, 'Counterterrorism. A Game-Theoretic Analysis', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49/2 (April 2005) 183-200.
- ¹⁴ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, 'How The Weak Win Wars', *International Security* 26/1 (Summer 2001) 95.

- ¹⁵ Kurt Weyland, 'A Paradox of Success? Determinants of Political Support For [Peruvian] President Fujimori', *International Studies Quarterly* 44/3 (Sep. 2000) 481-502.
- ¹⁶ Christopher Sprecher and Karl Derouen, 'Israeli Military Actions And Internalization-Externalization Processes', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46/2 (April 2002) 244-259.
- ¹⁷ Steven R. David, 'Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy Of Targeted Killing', *Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 51* (Ramat-Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University) 7-8.
- ¹⁸ Sergio Catignani, 'The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap Between Israeli Counterterrorism Strategy and Tactics During the Al-Aqsa Intifada', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28/1 (February 2005) 72.
- ¹⁹ Bruce Hoffman, 'Responding to Terrorism [by the US] Across the Technological Spectrum', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 6/3 (autumn 1994) 366-390.
- ²⁰ *Palestinian Terrorism in 2005*, available at <http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/palestinian_terror_e.pdf>, 20.
- ²¹ Even in the 1948 war, GDP declined (by 3.1 percent) but almost doubled the following year in the following year as a result of mass immigration. See Haim Barkai 'Hapeilut ha-Kalkalit Ha-Realit shel Milhemet Ha-Hatzmaut', in Alon Kadish (ed.) *Milchemet Ha-Hatzmaut Tashah-Tashat: Diyun Mehudash* (Tel-Aviv: Misrad Habitachon, 2005) 767.
- ²² *Suicide-bombing Terrorism During the Current Israel-Palestinian Confrontation (September 2000-December 2005*, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), January 1, 2006) 21, 23.
- ²³ Amir Oren, 'The Dangers That Did Not Concern the Voter', *Haaretz*, 31 March 2006.
- ²⁴ *Palestinian Terrorism in 2005*, 20-22.
- ²⁵ Asaf Zussman and Noam Zussman 'Targeted Killings: Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Counterterrorism Policy', Bank of Israel Discussion Paper No. 2005.02 (January 2005) 4-5.
- ²⁶ See <http://www.phrmg.org/aqsa/list_of_assassination_english.htm>.
- ²⁷ *Palestinian Terrorism in 2005*, 8.
- ²⁸ 'World Bank Report: Palestinian Economy Remains Stagnant After Four Years of Intifada' (2004), available at <<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/wbgaza-4yrassessment.pdf>>, 11.
- ²⁹ 'World Bank Report: Palestinian Economy Remains Stagnant After Four Years of Intifada', 12.
- ³⁰ Figures derived from maps accessed from <<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/>>.
- ³¹ Kydd and Walter, 'Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence', 265.
- ³² '2004 Terrorism Data', available at <<http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=23521>>.
- ³³ JMCC polls June 2002-June 2004 available at <<http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results.html>>.
- ³⁴ *Palestinian Terrorism in 2005*, 18.

³⁵ In fact, the analysis I presented on the impact of the Palestinian violence intifada is basically summarized in a special report the Hamas publicized at the end of September 2003 commemorating the third anniversary of the outbreak of violence. See 'Qira'a Daqiqa li-A'thar al-Intifad 'ala al-Ihtilal al-Sahiyuni', available at <http://www.palestine-info.net/arabic/spfiles/4th_year/intefada1.htm. September 26>. The report estimates correctly that GDP per capita declined by six percent in the first two years of the intifada.

³⁶ See http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/am/publish/article_757.shtml, 19 April 2003.

³⁷ See http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/cgi-bin/am/exec/search.cgi?keyword=israeli%20economy&cat=&template=search%2Fsearch_results.html&perpage=10&start=11 23 February 2003.

³⁸ For an excellent analysis of the March offensive and indeed on the tactical novelties of the IDF, see Catignani, 'The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap Between Israeli Counterterrorism Strategy and Tactics During the Al-Aqsa Intifada', 63-67.

³⁹ Data from <http://www.btselem.org/english/Statistics/Detainees_and_Prisoners.asp>

⁴⁰ *Palestinian Terrorism in 2005*, 18.

⁴¹ http://www.palestinemonitor.org/new_web/4_years_intifada_anniversary.htm.

See also Edward Kaplan, Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal and Claude Sambani, 'What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model', *Studies in Conflict and Terror Studies* 28/3 (May-June 2005) 234.

⁴² Byman, Daniel. 'Do Targeted Killings Work?' *Foreign Affairs*, 85/2 (March-April 2006) 101-02.

⁴³ Orit Galili, 'The Ministry of Police Has Drawn Plans to Separate Israel from the Territories', *Haaretz Supplement*, 26 January 1995.

⁴⁴ For more general analysis on these aspects see Michael Kobi and Amnon Ramon, *Around Jerusalem: General Background and Ramifications on the Functioning of the Metropolitan Zone Surrounding It* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for the Study of Israel, 2004) in Hebrew.

⁴⁵ Diana Bechor, 'The Cabinet Approved the Route of the Separation Fence, *Ynet*, 14 August 2002.

⁴⁶ <http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/purpose.htm> (Accessed December 13, 2005.)

⁴⁷ 'Data on the Separation Barrier – April 2004', available at <http://www.btselem.org>.

⁴⁸ Isaac Ben- Israel, Oren Setter, and Asher Tishler, 'R& D and the War on Terrorism: Generalizing the Israeli Experience', in Andrew James, ed., *Science and Technology: Policies for the Anti- Terrorism Era* (Oxford: IOS Press), forthcoming.

⁴⁹ Dafna Shayek, "Meavtehim beMosdot Zibbur uveAsakim Pratiim," Hakneset-Merkaz HaMekar vahaMeida, First Draft, April 2003, p. 5.

⁵⁰ "Five Years Of Violent Confrontation Between Israel And The Palestinians: Data And Characteristics", http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pro_13_10_e.htm.

⁵¹ Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, 'The Effectiveness Of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis', *American Political Science Review*, 87/ 4 (Dec. 1993) pp. 829-844. Isabelle Duyvestey, 'The Paradoxes of Terrorism: an

Attempt at Theory' (paper presented at WISC Conference, Istanbul, August 2005)
12.

⁵² '2004 Terrorism Data', 7.

⁵³ For a recent article by a Palestinian analyst describing the use of Qassams as detrimental to Palestinian interests, see Umar Hilmi al-Ghawl: 'Su'al al-Yawm: Ayu Muqawama Nuridu?' *Al-Hayat al-Jadida*, 13 April 2006.

⁵⁴ Catignani, 'The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap Between Israeli Counterterrorism Strategy and Tactics During the Al-Aqsa Intifada', 72.

⁵⁵ Many of these issues, principally attacks by Fatah and security service personnel against Hamas cabinet and legislative council members are to be investigated by a special parliamentary committee. See 'Al-Tashri'i Yuqarir Tashkil Lajna Barlimania li-Taqa'i al-Haq'ig fi al-Ahdath al-Musifa bil-Diffa wal-Qutta<', *Al-Quds*, 14 June 2006; "Al-Tashri'i Yabda al-Tahqiq fi Ahdath al-Shaghbi fi Ramallah," available at <http://www.palestineinfo.net/arabic/palestoday/dailynews/2006/june06/13_6/details6.htm#7>. On tensions between the Presidency and the Hamas government, see 'LiMatha Narfudhu al-Istifta' Ala Wathiqat al-Usra fi Sijn Hadarim', available at <http://www.palestineinfo.net/arabic/hamas/statements/2006/14_6_06_1.htm>.

⁵⁶ 'News of the Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation', June 1-14, 2006, available at <http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/t14june_e06.pdf> 14.

⁵⁷ Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, 'The Risks of Palestinian Statehood', *Survival*, 39/2 (Summer 1997) 23-41.