On March 15, 2011, Palestinians took to the streets in the occupied West Bank and Gaza calling for unity and elections to the Palestinian National Council. The youth took the lead, inspired by the Arab uprisings, mainly in Tunisia and Egypt. Was it a trend or a natural development? What lasting effects did it have on Palestinian politics?
Both Hamas' government in Gaza and Fatah's in the West Bank were ready for the movements. They had never dealt with such a mass movement, but they definitely planned to hijack it and direct it to their paths.
The bigger threat was in Gaza. Tens of thousands of people took part in the mass protests compared to 5,000, at best, in the West Bank. The gap was clear. Fatah members were the core of the Gaza protests; they participated in the thousands.
In the West Bank, Hamas members did not participate. And they would not have been allowed to demonstrate in the West Bank. So, we were a few thousand. Many were Fatah members who wanted to make sure the movement pointed a finger at Hamas.
In Gaza, the protests were violently suppressed. In the West Bank, suppression tactics were slightly different. Sexual harassment and violence was definitely present, but the participation of the security forces was less overt.
A year after the movement, what did it achieve? And where are the Palestinian youth today? The major downside of the movement was the absence of mobilization. The youth who took the lead probably thought that as they went to the streets, thousands would follow just like in Tunisia and Egypt. The youth groups' first mistake was comparing the Palestinian situation to the rest of the Arabs. A lot of the decisions were inspired by advice taken from the youth of Egypt, and so failed to deal with the unique situation of Palestine.
A year after the March 15 protests, it has become clear that the key is not in mobilizing the youth, but mobilizing the people. We need a popular movement, not a youth movement. Still, we need urgent reforms in factional youth bodies.
The main goals were not achieved. There were failures and successes. The way forward is to build on the achievements and criticize the failures. March 15 youth failed in the self-criticism process. They mostly chose to ignore major deficiencies in the movement.
The youth groups were described as "elitists" by many. Youths with great potential were pushed away. The closure was driven by an over-reaction to security issues and fears of being spied on. This resulted in a major weakness in mobilization. The youth failed to connect with the people. It seemed as if the groups were just new factions to add to the long list of factions. Groups were competing to adopt activities through the media resembling factions’ behavior.
Not to undermine the efforts of any group, but some embraced former members of factions who -- despite disassociating with their factions in word -- still adopted the same methods in practice. We need to compete in making sacrifices rather than taking leadership. Despite all the powerful work done by the youth in the past year, the readiness for real sacrifice was marginal.
Despite the many downsides, there have been major achievements that could help to build a successful movement. The past year has produced a female leadership within the youth movement. This leadership has been vital in the success of many activities, whether internally or against the occupation.
Also, the organized network of Palestinian tweeps around the world has formed a powerful tool on social media. It is not enough without mobilization on the ground, but it could be very powerful, and it was. With a bit more strategizing and planning, this network on Twitter could have a greater impact on the coverage of Palestinian issues.
The most important achievement in the past year remains the return marches on May 15 and June 5, when Palestinians in Syria and Lebanon marched on mass to their homeland. The spontaneous coordination that took place between Palestinians in refugee camps in exile and inside Palestine set new rules to the game. It was the real unity Palestinians aspire for. We will see more of it in the coming days.
The youth movement needs to be subsidized by a popular movement. We don't need groups: we need a movement. The focus should be diverted to mass mobilization rather than building groups and playing the attractive roles of "youth activists." Leadership emerges after an uprising takes place.
We need to differentiate between tactics and strategies. Advocating for direct PNC elections for all Palestinians should not be a goal by itself. Unity is a tool to help us in our end goals. The end goal is not to end occupation. This is a vague term used by all sides even those with different ultimate aims. The end goal is to achieve the full right of return to all Palestinian refugees and the dismantling of the Zionist apartheid regime.
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