Israel’s disastrous commando operation against the Gaza relief flotilla delays and complicates — but does not entirely derail — the kiss-and-make-up session that would have played out at the White House on Tuesday, had Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not canceled his planned meeting with President Barack Obama
Netanyahu is under pressure, to be sure, and the biggest impact of this event may well be on his domestic standing — as Israelis question his and Defense Minister’s Ehud Barak’s competence. But as this event demonstrates, the prime minister’s ideology, coalition realities and priorities — Iran, not the peace process — haven’t changed all that much.
What’s changed is the American view.
The Gaza attack is sure to create several new minicrises: President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority will be forced to harden his position in the talks — if they’re not suspended; Hamas will try to exploit the incident to isolate Israel and break the siege; and there could be an effort in the U.N. Security Council to pass a tough anti-Israeli resolution.
And the Gaza incident arrives at the worst possible time for the Obama administration, coming at a key moment in its efforts to get a sanctions resolution on Iran out of the Security Council.
Strangely enough, the White House, having tried for 18 months now to strong-arm the prime minister, may finally be returning to the basic political law of gravity that has governed every U.S. president who wanted to do serious business in the Middle East.
The rule is: If you want an Arab-Israeli peace agreement, you can’t do it by going to war with an Israeli prime minister.
In fact, peace-making on the Israeli side has always been the domain of the tough guys. The history of the peace process — of withdrawal from territory and dismantling settlements — is not a history of the left or the peace camp. It is about the hawks: Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon and, maybe, Netanyahu.
That it took many senior officials in the administration, including the president, so long to figure this out is a testament to how transformative the thinking in Obamaland purported to be.
The new president appeared determined to fix what he saw as the Arab-Muslim problem created by his predecessor, so he came out empathizing with the Arabs in Cairo and pushing the Israelis on a comprehensive settlement freeze. Then, his administration had to back down when the Israelis refused to comply — alienating both the Arabs and the Israelis.
Another round over settlements during Vice President Joe Biden’s March trip to Jerusalem ended by producing a significant rift with the Israelis. But there was nowhere to take it — and no strategy to boot.
When Obama and Netanyahu finally do sit down, is there a strategy on which they can agree to avoid further tensions?
The answer is, probably not yet.
It’s clear the administration is looking for a way to reconcile the divergent views of the two sides of the peace process.
The prime minister has a bottom-up approach focused on practical steps such as supporting Palestinian economic development, building institutions, removing checkpoints and expanding Palestinian security responsibilities.
But Abbas has a top-down approach, focused on reaching agreement on the key political issues: a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders; Jerusalem as the capital of two states; and resolution of the refugee issue, which includes compensation and the right of return. If there is a way to reconcile these approaches, it’s likely to be achieved by forging an agreement about the borders of a Palestinian state, plus one other core issue.
The refugee issue, with its focus on rights and returning Palestinians, is too difficult to settle now. The process might come down to getting both sides to deal with the least contentious aspects of the Jerusalem problem (neighborhoods) and deferring the question of sovereignty and holy sites.
Even this will be a real stretch for Netanyahu and Abbas. Nor is it evident how an Israeli prime minister can make tough decisions on territory with a Palestinian president who can’t control Hamas and silence the guns.
What’s changed is that the Obama administration recognizes it has an Israel problem and is working to fix it.
There are now deep suspicions in Israel — and among the pro-Israeli community here — about how much this president understands Israel’s existential fears.
While many in the administration would love to change prime ministers if they could, they would welcome a larger coalition that brought in centrist elements that could push Netanyahu in a more practical direction.
In fact, there are those who argue that if the administration wants to corner the prime minister with a U.S. peace plan at some point, it needs to cover itself by making nice first. At the same time, there is certain to be talk at senior levels about how to use the Gaza crisis to get Israel to ease its economic pressures on Gaza.
But after 18 months, the Obama administration recognizes that Netanyahu may be here to stay. He represents, and is a reflection of, a more tough-minded Israeli public.
This wary and suspicious population, according to the polls, may be ready to be led toward an Israeli-Palestinian deal, but it first wants answers on Israeli security needs about Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.
That realization — plus the president’s evident sympathies for the Palestinians — won’t make a conflict-ending agreement possible. But it may create political space and energy for an agreement on territory.
And, even in Obamaland, where ambitions are galactically high, that would be a tremendous achievement.
Front Page Features