Q. Last week, Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas seemingly dropped his preconditions and invited Hamas to renew negotiations over a unity government. Why?
A. Abbas (Abu Mazen) took a step that he knew is not to the liking of Israel and the United States, both of which continue to insist on the Quartet's conditions for dealing with Hamas: abandoning terrorism, recognizing Israel and accepting the Oslo framework. Although he stated he was abandoning his demand that Hamas apologize for grabbing power in Gaza by force a year ago, Abbas also alluded to the recent Yemeni initiative for Hamas-Fateh negotiations, which did demand that Hamas reverse the Gaza takeover. This somewhat clouds the picture. Still, Hamas spokesmen in Gaza were quick to welcome Abbas' statement and Fateh and Hamas representatives reportedly met over the weekend in Dakar, capital of Senegal (which currently chairs the Islamic Conference Organization).
Were Hamas and Fateh to agree to reestablish a unity government along guidelines that do not correspond to those of the Quartet, this would almost certainly catalyze the suspension of the current American-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Hence the most obvious explanation for Abbas' step is that he has concluded there is little chance of a peace breakthrough with Israel and he has to cover his political flanks by talking to Hamas. This explanation reflects Palestinian despair with both the Israeli and American positions in negotiations. Yet it doesn't correspond with a relatively optimistic statement about progress made recently by chief Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurei (Aba Ala), who said the two sides had begun to draft an agreement. Nor did Abbas say anything specifically to indicate despair with the course of the talks. Abbas, incidentally, easily outscored his Hamas rivals in the latest PSR poll, seemingly reflecting public trust in the peace process for the moment.
Given the somewhat nebulous nature of Abbas' initiative (with or without conditions?), a number of alternative explanations suggest themselves. One is that he is simply trying to "light a fire" under the peace negotiations by suggesting he has alternatives. Another is that he wants to position himself for the advent of an Israel-Hamas ceasefire in and around Gaza. A ceasefire would likely boost Hamas' popularity on the Palestinian street and could be a prelude to more expansive Israel-Hamas contacts over prisoner exchange and the Gaza passages--where deployment of Palestinian Authority troops and possibly a UN buffer force would necessitate close Hamas-Fateh coordination. By offering unity talks with Hamas, Abbas could be ensuring he and the peace talks won't be overshadowed by a ceasefire. Alternatively, Abbas anticipates an Israeli military offensive into Gaza and wants to ensure that he and the Ramallah-based Palestinian leadership are not castigated by angry Palestinians and other Arabs as collaborators with Israel.
So far, Cairo has agreed to mediate renewed Fateh-Hamas talks--a task the Egyptians filled in the past. Hamas, for its part, wants Qatar to play a role. The maverick Gulf emirate mediated the recent Lebanese agreement in which Hezbollah came out on top; Hamas leaders presumably feel that Doha could do the same for them.
All in all, this could be seen as a smart tactical move for Abbas as long as it does not come at the cost of progress in peace talks with Israel.
Q. Last week, Israeli Minister of Transportation Shaul Mofaz stated that an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear installations was unavoidable if the latter's weapons program continued. The price of oil jumped in response by $12 and the Middle East tension level rose. Why would Mofaz talk this way?
A. Mofaz's threat followed upon a visit to Washington by PM Ehud Olmert that was devoted in part to discussions with the Bush administration regarding ways to deal with Iran's nuclear program. While both Olmert and Bush have since clarified publicly that there are still effective non-military sanctions that can be evoked against Iran, Israel (like other places) is rife with rumors that before leaving office, and especially if his successor is Barack Obama, President Bush will authorize some sort of military initiative against Iran.
Mofaz's statement came against this international backdrop, allowing him to portray himself as a knowledgeable security thinker very much au courant with thinking about Iran. Mofaz, after all, is a former IDF chief of staff and, under Ariel Sharon, minister of defense who is currently charged by Olmert with representing Israel in an annual strategic security dialogue with the US. Mofaz is also of Persian origin and a Farsi speaker, though experience shows that this gives him little if any real comparative insight into the thinking of Iran's Islamist leaders.
But the more relevant backdrop to Mofaz's remark about Iran, and for that matter to all of his recent hawkish statements (e.g., Israel must hold onto the Golan even under peace with Syria), is politics. Mofaz has presented his candidacy in the Kadima primaries that are being organized to select a successor to Olmert if the prime minister resigns under corruption charges. He principal rival is FM Tzipi Livni, whose views on issues like Iran and Syria are decidedly less belligerent. A large portion of Kadima party members, probably a majority, are, like Mofaz, former Likudniks, and his hawkish statement on Iran was a clear case of pandering to their presumed political leanings.
Mofaz is basically just another irresponsible politician. A month or so ago, Infrastructure Minister Binyamin (Fuad) Ben Eliezer (Labor) made waves with a slightly less aggressive threat--to attack Iran if it attacks Israel--seemingly brought on by his perceived need to score political points. Notably, both Ben Eliezer and Mofaz seem to suffer the frustrations of being former defense ministers now relegated to less prominent positions. In the Mofaz case, a minimal inquiry into the foibles of Israeli politics by any outside observer was sufficient to ascertain that he was not speaking for Olmert, Defense Minister Ehud Barak or the IDF that he once commanded.
This is why the far-reaching effect of Mofaz's remark on the broader Middle East and the global economy must give us pause to reflect on the fragility of the current situation. Typically, commentator Mazin Hammad of Qatar's al-Watan speculated that Mofaz "is revealing what may be the most important secret the Israelis and the Americans are sitting on, thus damaging the prospects of any planned military operation [against Iran]. This is certainly a very steep price to pay merely for preparing for the Kadima party leadership elections."
As far back as the second Rabin premiership (1992-95), the escalatory effect of Israeli threats against Iran was recognized and a concerted effort made to compel bombastic ministers and military officers to hold their tongue. The rationale was, and is, that it is foolish for Israel to gratuitously raise its ranking on Iran's list of enemies when Tehran has so many regional and international antagonists and detractors to worry about.
At a time when Israel insists that the Iranian nuclear threat is a regional and global problem that requires an international solution, remarks like that made by Mofaz seem particularly inept. They tell us something about the man who wants to head Kadima and the government of Israel.
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