Israel’s current siege of Gaza must be inflicting the Palestinian President, Abu Mazen, with a sharp pain to the temples. This ache, which has been intermittent since June 2007, is undoubtedly caused this time by the confusion over how to act in response to the newest demonstration of Israeli aggression. The 1.5 million people of Gaza, the president’s people, are caught up as innocent victims in a fray between Palestinian rockets from the coastal strip and Israeli air strikes. They remain, without sufficient food, medical supplies and electricity, isolated in the darkness of humanitarian disaster. How is Abu Mazen to address this issue firmly, while at the same time retain his people’s respect and manage to continue the peace process with the Israelis?
Abu Mazen faces a deluge of varying opinions from aides, advisers and experts, pressure from the Israelis not to jeopardize the peace process by intervening, being expected to answer questions and queries from a vast range of international officials as well as having to ultimately answer to and satisfy his own people. However, Abu Mazen has been elected for this very reason - to make these decisions and act as their representative in the face of such adversity. They certainly do not expect Abu Mazen to shrivel into obscurity.
The Palestinian President responded to the episode in Gaza by calling upon the Israeli government to lift its blockade immediately while advising that negotiations must still go on with Israel. “We must even intensify these negotiations to end the suffering of our people…how can we persuade the other side that our people are suffering if we turn our backs and say no to negotiations with Israel?”
These rather diplomatic comments came amidst calls from many high-ranking Palestinian officials for Abu Mazen to show solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza. PLC Speaker, Aziz Dweik, proclaimed that negotiations should be stalled while the PA and Hamas “suppress all partial disagreements, take a united Palestinian stance and act through all available means to lift the siege”.
It is difficult for the Palestinian people to watch Abu Mazen as he seems to idly stand by as the situation in Gaza deteriorates. Israel’s complete closure of the “hostile territory” as a result of inaccurate and primitive Qassam rockets has received a barrage of condemnation from many countries and international aid/relief organizations. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon; John Holmes, Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs; John Duggard, the head of UN for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories and John Ging, the head of UNRWA in Gaza have all expressed their opposition to this collective punishment of Palestinians in the coastal strip. They emphasized that this inhumane action, which violates Articles 31 and 33 of the IV Geneva Convention, cannot be justified even by rocket attacks and will be ineffective, breeding more radicalism.
The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that she understood the need for Israelis to protect their people but highlighted “the importance of not allowing a humanitarian crisis to unfold”. The EU’s perspective was epitomized by their External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who stated that “neither the blockade nor the recent military strikes are able to prevent the rocket attacks…only credible political agreement”.
Meanwhile, Israel almost completely absolves itself from blame in exacerbating the situation. Prime Minister Olmert initially reassured the international community by promising that Israel would not let Gaza plunge into humanitarian crisis but then, in a phrase that admits to collectively punishing Palestinians, asserted that if Gaza doesn’t have fuel “all the residents of Gaza can walk…because they have a murderous terrorist regime”. Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, also pledged her dedication to the cause of security mentioning that “Israel will continue to act and fulfill its commitment to its citizens even at the price of condemnation”.
High rankings Israeli officials choose to explain the escalation of humanitarian crisis in Gaza as one complex and intricate act of deception by Hamas, sabotaging Gaza’s own power supplies and turning off the power unnecessarily “to take advantage of the pictures of darkness in Gaza for its public relations needs”.
Israel may have withdrawn from Gaza in 2005 but the area still remains very much an occupied territory. Israel controls all the border crossings, the land, the air, the sea, the population registry and the tax revenues. Of course, any sort of closure on Gaza is going to have a profound affect on its population. Furthermore, Hamas cannot feasibly be credited with manipulating the conditions in Gaza to the extent of casting 800,000 people into darkness, closing 180 fuel stations, killing innocent patients in hospitals as a result of shutting off generators and ensuring that Gaza is constantly 80% reliant on aid.
Whether they want to believe it or not, Israel has pushed Gaza to the point of desperation. The people are so distressed that on January 23, the UN reported that tens of thousands of Gazans flooded through to Egypt to escape the unbearable isolation for food and supplies. Part of the seven-mile wall dividing Rafah and Egypt has already been destroyed by masked gunmen.
With these new developments, what are Abu Mazen’s intentions toward Gaza? This is a question that is proving most difficult to decipher. The analysis can be compartmentalized into three sections; positive intervention, restricted action and the “greater good” strategy.
Is Abu Mazen focusing all his energy on resolving the Gaza issue? Evidence of positive intervention could include Abu Mazen’s rigorous concentration on striving to achieve a peace agreement with the Israelis. As the president affirmed, a solution for Gaza will only come if the peace process with Israel prevails. However, with the peace process as stagnant as it is and with Gaza being an immediate problem, this idea is surely rhetoric designed to buy the president more time to deliberate on how to proceed. Additionally, positive intervention could be perceived as Abu Mazen meeting with Hamas politburo chief, Khaled Mesha’al and Egyptian President Mubarak. The incident in Rafah has provided Mesha’al and Abu Mazen with a wonderful opportunity. The trio does not have to talk about Hamas’ control of Gaza but instead can launch initial dialogue based on the uncontroversial topic of border crossings. Mesha’al has already called for an “unconditional” meeting, stating that he would accept joint PA/Egyptian monitoring of Rafah.
Then there is the theory that Abu Mazen wants to adopt a policy of positive intervention but is restricted on account of being the subordinate player in the unequal occupier v. occupied relationship. Abu Mazen may be powerless to act, obligated by the words of Tzipi Livni, who declares that both parties “must refrain from letting problems from the outside come into the negotiating room”. As a “partner” in peace, Abu Mazen seemed to enjoy a minor victory on January 22 when Israel lifted the blockage and transferred 700,000 liters of fuel and 50 trucks worth of food and medical supplies to Gaza. Nevertheless, Abu Mazen only managed to negotiate two days worth of supplies. This lack of aid, in conjunction with the fact that Gazans have burst through Rafah into Egypt to secure their own supplies, makes Abu Mazen’s efforts appear insufficient thus diminishing his ability to compromise with Israel and reinforcing the notion that Israel assesses what Gaza’s essential needs are and acts accordingly, as Israeli Defense spokesperson Schlomo Bror said.
The final policy Abu Mazen could be employing is the “greater good” strategy. It is no surprise that Abu Mazen is under significant pressure from the Arab states regarding the situation in Gaza, as it is no surprise that Gaza is a hindrance to Israel, an area they would like to come under the jurisdiction of Egypt. Gaza is also an inconvenience for Abu Mazen, especially while Hamas is in control, as they are stalling the peace process. Therefore, the somewhat muted reactions of Abu Mazen may not just be confusion but part of a more detailed scheme to cripple Hamas. After all, he is receiving no such pressure from the West Bank to address Gaza. In a vigil held in solidarity with the people of Gaza in the de facto capital Ramallah, there were only 200 demonstrators. Another example of this “greater good” policy could be the PLO initiative to dissolve the PLC. Hamas does not have many bargaining chips but they do have Gilad Schalit. If they manage to secure a prisoner swap, Schalit for Hamas PLC members, they could reach a quorum and thus negate all motions passed by Abu Mazen since June. This is unlikely to happen now on the Hamas side, because of the air strikes and blockades, while on the Israeli side, it is not in their interests to offer that degree of power to the rulers of Gaza – at any price. In any event, leaving Israel to deal with Hamas while condemning their actions, enough as to convince the international community of serious concern, can only solidify Abu Mazen’s position in the long run.
It is uncertain as to whether Abu Mazen plans to intervene, wants to but is restricted or if he simply doesn’t believe interfering is conducive to his plans. This is due to the complexity of analyzing some of his more ambiguous reactions to the incidents as well as attempting to predict the overall intentions of Israel, the PA and Hamas. What is undeniably clear is that Gaza is in dire humanitarian crisis. But once again, Hamas has come through with the public relations victory. They did not take responsibility for the explosions that destroyed the fence but it is highly unlikely that it could have been done without their consent.
As it stands, Egypt’s Foreign Ministry has said that the Rafah Crossing would remain open as long as the humanitarian crisis continues. This leaves Abu Mazen with a tough choice to make. Does he carry on working with Israel for peace while proclaiming his inability to intervene and handing over responsibility of Gaza to Egypt? Or, does he opt for the alternative which involves defying his peace “partner” and showing the Gazans more than just solidarity by replacing his offerings of words with active steps forward, in order to resolve the scenario by firstly agreeing to talk to Hamas and Egypt. Does he want to? Is he able to? Do the two options have to be mutually exclusive?
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