EHUD VS. EHUD: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak have been trading barbs over Israel’s failure to evacuate settlement outposts built in violation of Israeli law and Israel’s commitments to the United States. During a media availability with Olmert, U.S. President George W. Bush displayed some impatience over this issue on Wednesday. He said: “Look, I mean, we’ve been talking about it for four years. The agreement was, get rid of outposts, illegal outposts, and they ought to go.”
Speaking to a Kadima Party audience on Sunday, Olmert commented that the continued presence of the outposts was “intolerable” and a “disgrace.” For this statement, the prime minister drew criticism from the peace camp. A Peace Now spokesperson pointed to Olmert’s hypocrisy, reminding Israel Radio that “since Olmert took office, not a single outpost has been dismantled. Olmert should stop acting like a commentator and start taking action against illegal outposts.” Labor Knesset Member Ophir Pines also lashed out at Olmert. “There has never been a government that [so] methodically and consistently believes that words can replace actions,” he said.
Not to be left out, the settlers’ main umbrella organization called for the outposts issue to be settled by negotiations, characterizing Olmert’s comments as a “diversion.”
The settlers were not alone. Individuals identified as close associates of Defense Minister Barak told reporters that Olmert’s plan to evict squatters was “rash,” and pointed to a proposed compromise agreement between the settlers and the Defense Ministry. Barak’s aides did not hesitate to strike below the belt. “Olmert is acting with the same frivolousness that characterized his behavior in the Second Lebanon War,” they told Haaretz, adding that the prime minister was “endangering efforts to achieve an evacuation without violence.”
The draft agreement would reportedly allow for the peaceful evacuation of 18 outposts in exchange for the Israeli government’s construction of infrastructure projects in the West Bank, presumably facilitating the expansion of other settlements. There are more than 100 unauthorized outposts in the West Bank today, 50 of which Israel is required to remove under the Road Map.
Writing in Friday’s Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea explores the different approaches of Olmert and Barak. “Ehud Barak believed that he could solve the question of the illegal outposts by means of an agreement with the Settlers Council,” he writes. “That’s what he did in the last round, when he was prime minister: [in 1999] he sent Yossi Vardi, who was then his adviser on settlement affairs (and today the chairman of the Jordan Valley Regional Council) to a marathon of secret talks with Zeev (Zambish) Hever, the man who makes the decisions in the Settlers Council. A compromise was reached: some of the outposts would be koshered, others would be evacuated. In time, Vardi admitted to me that the compromise was a bluff: Zambish evacuated dummy outposts and in return, laundered the outposts he cared about most. Barak explained to the Americans that when he negotiated with Arafat on the permanent status arrangement, the status of a few dozen marginal places would not add or detract. We shouldn’t squander political power on their evacuation, he said.”
“Barak wanted to repeat this in the Olmert government,” explains Barnea. “He sent his adviser on settlement affairs, Eitan Broshi, to a marathon of secret talks with Zambish. The outcome was similar. In return for removing a few outposts by agreement, Zambish demanded the authorization of the construction of 80 houses on Mt. Eval, overlooking Nablus, of 52 apartments in Elkana, instead of the 52 illegal pre-fabs that had been placed, and more and more and more.”
Reporting on the prime minister’s approach, Barnea writes that when “Olmert heard from Barak about the agreement being worked out, he said no. He assumed that if he were to consent, this would make him look like a crook to his Palestinian interlocutors. Even worse: it would make him look like to crook to Bush. He suspected Barak of trying to sew him the emperor’s new clothes. If he wasn’t seen as a cheat, he would be seen as a fool… It seems that Olmert has reached the realization that he has to evacuate one illegal outpost—Migron, near Ramallah, the outpost that is at the top of the American list—and to remove it by force.”
Despite these tactical squabbles within the Israeli government, even Israel’s prominent hawks want to see the outposts come down. In Wednesday’s Yedioth Ahronoth, Dov Weissglas, confidant to former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, writes that a peace agreement with the Palestinians “is impossible at this time.” Nevertheless, he recommends that Israel “evacuate immediately all the unauthorized outposts—a painful matter that is unnecessarily and unjustifiably worsening the problem of the Israeli presence in Judea and Samaria, which creates tension between us and the U.S., which plays constantly into Palestinian contentions and undermines Israel’s reputation as a state of law.” Weissglas also calls for “removing or relocating remote and isolated settlements closer to the security fence and encouraging settlers to do so by means of quickly legislating an evacuation-compensation law; beginning to reduce the military presence; withdrawing the IDF from Palestinian population centers and shifting troops, as far as possible, west toward the fence area in such a way as to safeguard central Israel from Palestinian rocket fire. Roadblocks and barriers would be removed, Palestinian towns and cities would be linked again; the mistake of 1967 of annexing crowded areas that have no links to Jerusalem would be rectified; areas that are vacated of an Israeli presence would be given to the PA to administer while keeping Israeli security measures and intelligence as far as necessary.”
“In parallel,” advocates Weissglas, “Israel would work together with the world’s nations to develop the Palestinian economy, to raise the standard of living and create a real motive for the Palestinians to want quiet and stability.” (White House, 1/9/08; Israel Army Radio, 1/13/08; Haaretz, 1/13 & 1/14/08; Jerusalem Post, 1/13/08; AP, 1/13/08; Yedioth Ahronoth, 1/9 & 1/11/08)
Israel’s Impotent Right: “This is definitely not the booming voice of the people that we expected Bush to hear from his Jerusalem hotel balcony,” said right-wing activist Uri Ephraim who participated in a protest intended to oppose negotiations over Jerusalem. “We expected tens of thousands to create this stunning visual. Where are the people now that their message can reach such an important world leader?” asked Ephraim.
Ephraim’s disappointment at the weak turnout from Israel’s anti-peace camp was covered in the Jerusalem Post under the headline “Dismay on Right at low turnout for anti-Bush rallies.” In this article, the conservative newspaper explained that Israeli right-wing organizations expected that last week’s visit by U.S. President George W. Bush “would be the perfect opportunity to press their campaign for maintaining a united Jerusalem under Jewish control. The results, however, have been disappointing, as the low turnout and changing political messages have distracted from their argument. Marking Bush’s final night in Jerusalem on Thursday, right-wing protesters gathered in the middle of the city to demonstrate for a united Jerusalem. Organizers said that thousands were expected to arrive, but fewer than 1,000 showed up.”
Nadav Shragai – a journalist considered sympathetic to settlers – authored an article for Haaretz titled, “Right Wing opposition to [Jerusalem] split is waning,” in which he noted that the “human chain of demonstrators who arrived at the Old City on Monday to hold hands around the old wall may have been photogenic, but it comprised no more than 5,000 demonstrators. Compare that with the mass rally against the city’s division in 2000 - which drew a crowd of over 300,000 people - and you realize something has changed.”
Another right-wing rally which did not live up to the boastful predictions of its organizers drew between 1,000 to 2,000 demonstrators Tuesday to a building site in East Jerusalem’s Har Homa, where Israeli plans for additional construction are drawing international criticism. That demonstration featured trucks loaded with construction equipment which were then reportedly dispatched to create as many as nine new illegal settler outposts in the West Bank.
While Israel’s right struggles with its inability to mobilize activists, its efforts to establish facts on the ground may succeed in derailing a possible two-state solution in which Palestinian contiguity would extend to Jerusalem’s Old City. Privately-financed construction may soon begin on 60 new housing units in East Jerusalem’s Ras el-Amud neighborhood, a densely-populated Palestinian neighborhood on the slopes of the Mount of Olives. Shragai reports that the “Jerusalem municipality has approved the project, which sources on the right have said could impede the creation of a Palestinian corridor between the eastern West Bank and the Temple Mount.” This corridor, Shragai points out, “via the old Jericho road toward the Lions Gate and the Temple Mount - has been raised in the past in talks between Israel and the Palestinians.” (Jerusalem Post, 1/10/08; Haaretz, 1/8 & 1/10/08; Arutz 7, 1/9/08; Ma’ariv, 1/8/08)
Barghouti Dilemma: There are a number of indications that a prisoner swap deal between Israel and Hamas, moderated by Egypt, is making progress. According to Arab sources, Israel has agreed to release jailed Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti as part of a deal for the release of kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit. According to reports of the agreement, Israel would initially transfer 100 prisoners to Egypt, while Hamas would simultaneously release Shalit to Egyptian custody. After an additional 150 Palestinian prisoners are freed by Israel, Egyptian authorities would transfer Shalit to Israel.
A spokesperson for Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert denied that Israel agreed to such a deal. Nevertheless, the prime minister initiated a process expected to loosen current Israeli criteria over which Palestinian prisoners can be released. On Thursday, Olmert met for over two hours with the committee charged with recommending a new policy, which is expected to be broad enough to enable Barghouti’s release. The forum, which includes Vice Premier Haim Ramon, Foreign Minister Tzippi Livni, Public Security Minister Avi Dichter, Justice Minister Daniel Friedmann and Minister without Portfolio Ami Ayalon, met four times over the past two weeks. Those meetings were also attended by the coordinator of Israeli policy vis-à-vis Israelis taken captive by Hamas and Hezbollah, Ofer Dekel, Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin, and Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi.
Another indication of progress is the uncharacteristic discretion shown by these Israeli officials. Ramon, has reportedly been refusing to answer questions on the matter, and even requested that a Knesset discussion on the matter be removed from the agenda. Haaretz quotes an Israeli security source saying that “both sides wish to close a deal, and the process of relaxing criteria is supposed to help with that.” That official also cautions that “this was the case before, and it still didn’t happen. So we need to move with caution, and it is not at all certain that we are nearing the end of the affair.”
Former Knesset Member Naomi Chazan believes that in a period marked by a “growing gap between the promise of a negotiated resolution of the conflict and the reality of rapid deterioration on the ground… no single move can contribute more to” fostering an atmosphere of goodwill “than a prisoner exchange spearheaded by the simultaneous release of Gilad Shalit and Marwan Barghouti.” Chazan observes that for Israelis, “Shalit’s prolonged incarceration in Gaza has come to represent the depravity of Palestinian Islamic extremism, thus not only sustaining but actually compounding the widespread Israeli suspicion and distrust of its immediate neighbors. For many Palestinians, Barghouti, in turn, has become the human symbol of the struggle to end the Israeli occupation. Along with the thousands arrested during the second intifada (including the bulk of the elected Hamas leadership), his imprisonment mirrors the widespread despair of Palestinians with their failure to rid themselves of Israeli overrule. Symbolically, then, the immediate release of Shalit and Barghouti may be viewed as a demonstrable act of good faith that would be welcomed by solid majorities in the two communities.”
Chazan adds that the “political implications of this type of gesture are also significant. Barghouti is emblematic of the new generation of Fatah leaders. He constitutes - even in jail - an important bridge between the party old guard represented by PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and the new generation of local grassroots activists… Shalit’s return is a political imperative for Israeli leaders as well. It proves that the state is willing to go the extra mile to bring home its captured soldiers, thus renewing flailing confidence not only in the government, but more importantly in the system as a whole. And, in both Israeli and Palestinian public opinion, a prisoner exchange will be greeted as a sign of political will - a tangible commitment to a vision of mutual accommodation.” Indeed, 71% of Israelis support the release of Barghouti in exchange for Shalit, according to a poll published in Friday’s Yedioth Ahronoth.
Ron Ben-Yishai, Yedioth Ahronoth’s security affairs columnist, writes that Hamas has much to gain in such a deal. It “would mark a propaganda victory [for Hamas] that it would be able to leverage in order to gain prestige and score political points in the domestic Palestinian arena and in the Arab theater.” In addition, Barghouti’s release would put into play a Fatah leader with whom Hamas could more easily engage in dialogue. Ben-Yishai points out that “during his time in prison Barghouti displayed the willingness and ability to engage in dialogue with Hamas members and reach compromises with them. This is unlike Abbas and [Prime Minister] Salam Fayyad, who condemn terrorists, doubt the armed struggle’s effectiveness, and demand that Hamas accept their complete authority in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.”
This might seem like a counter-intuitive move for Israel in light of its efforts to undermine Hamas’s popularity; indeed many Israeli officials oppose a deal for that very reason. Yet, Ben-Yishai also reports that Israeli Ministers Binyamin Ben Eliezer and Gideon Ezra, as well as Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai (all former senior security officials) believe that “if Barghouti is able to join the current Fatah leadership, he could make a significant contribution to Mahmoud Abbas’ status and help him implement the reforms that he has been trying to lead, without success thus far. Barghouti supporters argue that if he is able to join Abbas and Fayyad, this will create a winning troika; a leadership trio that would unite the disintegrating Fatah and boost the camp of those who support an agreement through negotiations.”
Haaretz columnists Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff write that one “key question is whether it is in fact possible to link the negotiations for Shalit to a broader deal. Two options exist: ‘Little Shalit’ - the release of 450 Hamas prisoners for him together with a temporary lull in hostilities in Gaza - and ‘Big Shalit,’ meaning the integration of the deal alongside the renewal of last year’s Mecca agreement, in the form of the reestablishment of a Fatah-Hamas unity government and the PA’s partial resumption of power in the Gaza Strip... The second option is a far bolder move, but it is not clear whether Olmert currently has the determination and the operative skill to pull it off, or whether he has negotiating experts capable of tailoring such a complex deal.”
If a deal is to go forward, irrespective of its scope, Yedioth’s Ben-Yishai offers some advice to his leaders: “The Israeli government must do everything so that media reports would form the clear impression that Mahmoud Abbas was the central Palestinian element that ultimately convinced Olmert to release Marwan Barghouti.”
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