THE IMPORTANCE of the Annapolis meeting on Middle East peace was not in the joint statement it produced, or in the speeches of the American, Israeli, and Palestinian leaders. Rather, it is in the real opportunity that the meeting has created for peace.
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This opportunity reflects the realization by all parties and the international community that the time has come for Israeli-Palestinian peace because the costs of inaction are high and mounting.
For all of its forecasted inadequacies, Annapolis in fact has delivered the official re-launching of peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians after a seven-year deep freeze.
It also significantly demonstrated a deep and public commitment of the United States, the international community, and major Arab players to supporting Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.
Rather than following a predictable and preordained trajectory, as is customary with high-level diplomatic summits, the objectives of the Annapolis meeting seemed to be continually shifting.
The initial idea was for Palestinians and Israelis to negotiate a joint declaration that would go beyond President Bush's oft-repeated "vision" for a Palestinian state, adding substance on borders, refugees, and Jerusalem, and essentially to formalize the agreement reached at the 2001Taba talks.
Despite intense talks, the two sides were too far apart at Annapolis to agree to such a declaration. Yet the results of the meeting are quite significant.
In the event, they managed to craft a statement of "joint understanding" committing both to the principle of two states living side by side in peace. And they formally launched bilateral negotiations on the core issues of Jerusalem, borders, and refugees.
For Palestinians, Annapolis means that the issue of Palestine is no longer narrowly framed in terms of terrorism and economic concerns. It is now, again, about achieving peace through a broad political agreement.
Palestinian independence is now acknowledged to be part of a battle of ideas being fought in the Middle East between violent radicalism versus peace and coexistence.
Annapolis also launched an updated version of the three-phase Roadmap that had long ago been dismissed by most observers.
This leaner and more focused Roadmap cuts out Phase Two - "provisional" Palestinian statehood - and combines actions to fulfill Phase One - actions on the ground by both parties - with negotiations on Phase Three, reaching a permanent status agreement.
It is significant that this new process sets an ambitious goal of the end of 2008 for reaching an agreement.
The first phase obligates Israel to freeze all settlement activity in the occupied territories including natural growth, remove settlement outposts illegal even under Israeli law, reopen Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem, and improve Palestinian daily life through easing restrictions on the movement of people and goods.
Palestinian responsibilities involve mainly security measures, most importantly visible efforts to end violence and reform the security services.
Previously, this phase had become bogged down because of differing interpretations over when obligations were fulfilled, as well as a dispute about Israel's insistence that the Palestinians had to complete their obligations first. The absence of an independent arbiter allowed Israel, the stronger party, to act as de facto judge of what constituted progress.
Annapolis addressed these problems by committing both sides to immediately implement their Roadmap responsibilities. Crucially, it established a three-party US, Israeli, and Palestinian mechanism to monitor implementation, headed by the United States as the final arbiter.
Whether the newly created opportunity for peace is realized will depend to a large extent on the political will of the parties. There are spoilers on both sides who can be expected to act sooner rather than later to derail the process.
Already, an Israeli government coalition partner, Shas, has connived with the opposition Likud to pass the first reading of a bill requiring that a political sharing of Jerusalem as the capital of two states - which any reasonable peace deal would entail - be approved by an almost unattainable two-thirds majority in the Knesset.
On the Palestinian side, Hamas seems to have lost the first battle but by no means the war. Its Gaza demonstrations the day of the Annapolis meeting only emphasized its political isolation.
Syria, where an anti-Annapolis conference featuring Hamas had been planned, canceled that conference and attended the peace discussions instead.
Hamas has found itself in the unenviable position of having only Iran as its fellow rejectionist, hardly a recipe for winning over Palestinian public opinion.
Whether Hamas's agenda of violent resistance will be vindicated or further discredited will depend on whether the months following Annapolis both improve Palestinian daily life and bring into clearer focus the political horizon of statehood.
Failure will strengthen violent radicalism and could even call into question prospects for a two-state solution into the foreseeable future.
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