Most commentaries inundating the press at the moment meticulously analyze the consequences of a failed summit and center on the probable break out of another Intifada, as highlighted by Ahmad Qurei. This may well be the case but it is important to recognize that a successful summit could also cause uproar amongst Israelis which in turn could affect the Palestinians and hinder any positive steps taken.
As it stands there is a date for Annapolis, or is there? According to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, the peace summit will apparently take place “in the last week of November”, stating also that invitations will be sent out in the next few days. Condoleezza Rice is believed to have informed Mahmoud Abbas last week that the summit will take place “in principle” on November 26. Then Ahmad Qurei, head of the Palestinian negotiating team, confirmed that November 26 is the date the summit would convene. However, Saeb Erekat, an associate of Qurei, has maintained that the date, the attendees and the invitations are yet to have been divulged. The head of the PLO negotiating affairs department declared that the situation is still working “under the frame of speculations”.
The precondition set by the US, which stipulated that there would be no date set or invitations sent until a joint document had been agreed upon by both sides, must have been abandoned. The Palestinian negotiating team had hoped to push for a detailed document with a sixth month timetable for implementation while Tzipi Livni, head of the Israeli negotiating team, and the US rejected this idea, alternatively supporting a more vague document. Their opinions on the purpose of the summit were epitomized by Olmert’s spokesperson Miri Eisin, who described how "Annapolis is not about implementation. It's about defining the issues, showing how we go forward without giving the solutions right now”.
Amongst all this ambiguity, the US Secretary of State admitted that she was not expecting the creation of a document anytime soon. Therefore, the US took the liberty of drawing up a “statement of intentions” for discussion at Annapolis to include the Road Map, the Arab Peace Initiative and UNSC Resolution 1551 on final status. However, the Palestinians may have succumbed to the pressure lately with Foreign Minister Riyad al Malki claiming that they are retreating from their detailed document demands and are prepared to use Annapolis to revive previous peace initiatives before starting on a final status document.
The wheels seem to have been put in motion for the peace summit. There is no comprehensive document which Abbas was so publicly vying for but there was surely never any doubt that Abbas would attend Annapolis. His future as president is on the line, let alone his reputation as a respected politician. Both are dependent on Annapolis. Without it, Abbas will just float in the abyss of political unpopularity until his power completely diminishes and he is ousted.
So let’s say that November 26 is in fact the Annapolis date. Let us also temporarily ignore the Peace Now study that shows that 8.1% of Israelis live in settlements while the number of units built is expanding, not freezing in accordance with the “peace process”. Let us also overlook the fact that incursions are still carried out and checkpoints are yet to have been reduced and then imagine that Saudi Arabia and Syria bear no relevance to the summit. Finally let us presume that Olmert will in fact make the summit. The premier could be detained if probes into three criminal investigations against him uncover instances of foul play.
With all this cast into the background, what does history teach us about the ramifications of an Israeli prime minister holding a peace summit with Palestinian representatives?
On November 3, thousands of people took to the streets in Tel Aviv to honor the 12 year anniversary of Yitzhak Rabin, who was assassinated by Israeli extremist Yigal Amir for signing the Oslo Accords with Yasser Arafat in 1994. An Israeli prime minister was perceived as granting concessions to the Palestinians and it cost him his life. Although the last 12 years have not resulted in an assassination, the same trend can be seen. An Israeli prime minister intends to grant “concessions” to the Palestinians. These may be minor compared to what the Palestinians demand, but in any case, the said prime minister may swiftly find himself out of office.
Shimon Peres took over from Rabin and progressed on with the implementation of the Taba Accords of 1995. However, following an increase in Palestinian attacks and Israeli public discontent, Israel voted Peres out for Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996. Netanyahu ended the settlement freeze, took a strict stance on east Jerusalem and eventually suspended the Oslo Accords in 1998. But at Wye River and Sharm el-Sheik, the prime minister demonstrated his willingness to seek a solution with the Palestinians which subsequently spelled an end to his tenure and made way for Ehud Barak in 1999. Barak did not last long either. In 2000 at Camp David, Barak was seen to make certain allowances, which the Israeli public deemed too much. Although Arafat rejected his offer, arguing that what was being offered was still unacceptable, the Israeli public had lost faith in their prime minister. Once the Al-Aqsa Intifada broke out in September 2000 and with failed attempts for peace, Barak was voted out of office in February 2001. This paved the way for Ariel Sharon, the catalyst of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and an individual who has always adamantly stood against granting any concessions to Palestinians. He was not voted out of office but suffered a stroke in 2006 and was succeeded by Ehud Olmert.
While Olmert’s approval ratings have seen a slight solidarity boost since he was diagnosed with prostate cancer, the prime minister is still desperately unpopular. A recent poll, according to the Sderot Conference, reported that Olmert is viewed as the most corrupt politician in Israel with a rating of 56%. In addition, to further demonstrate the lack of confidence shown in the present government, Vice Premier Haim Ramon scored 33% for corruption and Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, collected 29%. The reverse side of the poll asked who was the most honest. Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, was top with 46% while the main cynics of the summit, Transport Minister, Shaul Mofaz and Shas’ Eli Yishai obtained 34% and 25% respectively. Here, excluding Livni, the Israeli public chose to trust the individuals who categorically question the purpose of the summit.
“If we act decisively together, we and the Palestinians, there is a chance for us to reach real achievements, maybe even before the end of President Bush’s term.”
This very rhetoric from Olmert is causing concern with Israelis across the board. Most believe he is sacrificing the security of Israel due to US pressure, for the sake of speeding up the peace process and avoiding public failure. Statements by Condoleezza Rice and Israeli Military Intelligence Chief, Major Amos Yadlin, that suggest the summit simply “must not fail” are not sufficient enough reasons for the powers that be to warrant compromise with the Palestinians.
Likud’s Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed that Olmert is “making peace with a virtual partner, in a virtual reality”. The Likud party has also urged Olmert and Barak to quit.
These reservations are not just coming from non-coalition parties. Chairman of the coalition party Yishrael Beiteinu, Avigdor Lieberman, has advised that any discussion on the red line issues of core status will collapse the coalition and with it Olmert’s authority. Fellow party member, Yisrael Hassan, has referred to the peace summit as “a fantasy, not a vision”, comparing it to malaria with its symptoms of delusions, tremors and fever. Sharing these sentiments, although not as vehemently, is coalition party member Eli Yishai from Shas, who affirms that Israel has no partner to fulfill their obligations.
The Knesset members are not just voicing their individual and unsupported opinions. Two thousand extreme right demonstrators of the Yesha group took to the streets of Jerusalem to protest against Olmert and Peres. Their feelings were represented by Shaul Goldstein who said, “We know perfectly well that with the concessions envisaged by Olmert, Hamas will end up in the West Bank and the heart of Israel will be within range of their rockets”.
Are these genuine fears of security or are they a front for protecting a deep-rooted understanding regarding their state and their intentions which prohibit any cooperation or negotiation with Palestinians? Are the Israelis really collectively prepared to take the next step?
Abbas has declared that the PA has fulfilled 90% of their Road Map obligations whereas Israel has accomplished almost nothing. In addition Abbas asserts that the PA is not being given the chance to secure the West Bank. Last week Palestinian Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, stationed 308 special officers in Nablus charged with “restoring the rule of law”. They exchanged fire with political military wings but were undermined by Israeli incursions into Nablus which involved the raiding of two mosques.
On one level there are still those who fully support the philosophy on which the state of Israel was established. A recent piece by Dr. Ludwig Watzal included a comment by Akiva Eldar published in 2003 which stated that the “Zionist ethos was not about peaceful coexistence but about colonization and exclusive ideology to be imposed and maintained by force”. In 1937, David Ben Gurion stated that “after the formation of a large army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we will abolish partition and expand to the whole of Palestine”. Palestinians have been described as “beasts walking on two legs” by former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, “a cancer” by Moshe Ya’alon and famously another former prime minister, Golda Meir, announced that “there is no such thing as a Palestinian”. In 1992, a clause which duplicated the US Bill of Rights concerning equality was removed from Israeli Basic Law by the Knesset Committee. More recently most Israelis refuse to bargain over east Jerusalem regarding settlements or passing control over to the PA; many heavily endorse the expansion of settlements in the West Bank; 87% refuse to acknowledge a Palestinian right of return and approximately 62% of Israelis want their leaders to encourage the Arab community in Israel to emigrate.
Of course it would be a generalization to suppose that all Israelis still hold the words and beliefs of former prime ministers close to their hearts and fundamentally oppose any allowances to the Palestinians. Having said this, there are still a significant number of influential people who for whatever reasons, be it avid advocacy of Zionism, ultra Zionism under the guise of security concerns or genuine security worries over such a quick transference of responsibility, who believe that it is wrong to offer the Palestinians anything, at least at the moment. If Olmert does agree with Abbas to execute former peace arrangements with the goal of full final status solutions by 2009, Olmert’s coalition will collapse and the new prime minister, who will more than likely be Likud’s right wing Benjamin Netanyahu, will return relations back to square one. With Rice’s time in office ending in just over a year and with a new US president imminent, even a successful Annapolis by Olmert’s standards could prove seriously damaging to Palestinians. The people would have seen one step taken forward and two steps back and subsequently seek more effective representation. With decision making clouded by frustration and anger, who knows who they’ll turn to.
Middle East envoy to the Quartet Committee, Tony Blair, stressed that “the irony is that a final settlement is not hard to see. It is visible in the distance, the house on the hill but the path to it is utterly fraught”. At present, there is nothing ironic about the situation. There is no path directing parties to the top of the hill – only one which runs around the circumference of the hill at the bottom. The path up the hill is yet to be constructed as there is no one, at this moment, skilled enough to undertake such a complex task of securing the conditions in order to build a path on which both parties can walk confidently.
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