Recently, President Mahmoud Abbas urged the PLO Central Council to support his decision to call early elections. The usually composed Fatah leader showed signs of agitation in his address, directing his words towards his rivals Hamas, the victors of the bloody battle for Gaza over a month ago.
‘We will not wait for approval from those sitting over there in Gaza or from those sitting abroad…Hamas dug their own grave with their own nails as a result of the crimes they carried out in Gaza.’
While Hamas controls the Gaza Strip under the self proclaimed authority of deposed Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, the Fatah dominated West Bank is currently administered by new Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, appointed by Abbas and supported by Western leaders. Following the collapse of the unity government after the battle in Gaza between Fatah and Hamas, the two state solution has now taken on a new meaning. Seeking a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict was proving a difficult task within itself but now Palestine must resolve divisions within their own people before they can even contemplate resuming means to ensure an independent sovereign state.
The call for early elections is yet another tool in a long list of actions that aim to isolate Hamas. In the last month, Israel has released a fraction of expelled Palestinian tax revenues to Abbas in the sum of $100 million (more to follow), released 255 Palestinian prisoners (85% Fatah), offered amnesty to the Fatah affiliated al-Aqsa Brigades and organized regular meetings with Abbas to discuss methods for consolidating his power as well as deliberating over further measures such as alleviating travel restrictions in the West Bank. In addition, the US has promised $190 million this year to help Abbas with aid and humanitarian relief with a further $80 million to strengthen his security forces. The French have also donated €15 million while the British have contributed £3 million. Previously, when Hamas won the election in January 2006, the Quartet (EU, UN, US and Russia) abandoned all direct financial support to the Palestinian Authority, wishing not to associate themselves with a “terrorist” group.
Now the money and support has recommenced, it serves the purpose of bolstering the ‘moderate’ Fatah party while ostracizing Hamas. Despite Hamas assertions that there is a sense of increased stability in Gaza, the area is still an enclosed prison of poverty, unemployment and suffering. The Rafah crossing to the south, bridging Gaza with Egypt is closed with 10,000 people on both sides unable to get through, suffering from dire conditions and hardship. Both the Karni crossing and the Erez crossing are open but the amount of aid reaching Gaza is restricted and limited. Abbas will not allow EU monitors to return to Rafah until Hamas recognizes the Fatah government whereas Hamas refuses to back down and condemns any international presence in Gaza.
Abbas has attempted to call the Palestinian Legislative Council together in order to solve the governing crisis but this has repeatedly failed because Hamas continues to boycott the proceedings claiming that, despite events in Gaza, they are the democratically elected ruling body as of January 2006. Hamas also believes it is time for Abbas to appoint another Prime Minister as Salam Fayyad’s term is legally up. The same is true reversely; when Hamas calls for a PLC meeting, Fatah boycotts. Meeting the required 67 members for a quorum is therefore impossible.
This stagnant and almost dormant state of affairs has deeply frustrated Abbas to the point where he has played his wild card in the hope of rejuvenating and speeding up the process of progression so that policies can be considered and implemented, which is calling for early elections.
Senior Hamas officials, such as Sami Abu Zuhri, declare that the PLO Central Committee and Abbas do not have the credibility or legitimacy to call for such a motion, claiming that the PLO is an ‘illegal institution’ which does not represent Islamic Jihad or Hamas and therefore cannot make decisions that affect these parties. Hamas believes that a call for elections must be an issue agreed upon by the national parties as a whole.
Hamas politburo chief, Khaled Meshal in exile in Damascus, has called for Abbas to strive for dialogue with Hamas, claiming that his party has made mistakes. However, Abbas vehemently rejects any plea from Hamas, viewing the attack on Gaza as a ‘coup’ against his authority and a blatant abuse of the Mecca Agreement the two parties signed in March. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert has also warned Abbas that any liaison with Hamas will act as a severe barrier to their increasingly cooperative relationship.
But is calling early elections going to benefit Abbas? Unless Hamas concedes to Fatah’s requests, how is Abbas going to establish an effective election process in Gaza? When will it take place? Can Fatah actually win? Poles conducted by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research before the January 2006 elections showed that Fatah had a comfortable lead over Hamas. Nevertheless, it was Hamas who attained 44.5% of the vote and became the first party, other than Fatah, to win the majority in the 13-year history of the PA.
From research carried out by Fafo recently, only one in five people support the call for elections. Most predict that it will divide Palestine further. Having said this, 54% said they would vote for Fatah in an election, with 32% voting Hamas. It was conjectured that if the presidential election was imminent, Abbas would receive 26% of the vote, Haniyeh 21% and imprisoned Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti would acquire 14%.
However, Palestinian politics doesn’t exactly conform to global rules as it is very difficult to predict the political climate as opinions change in tandem with current events, which is nearly every day. However, for arguments’ sake, would Fatah win? It is more than likely, taking into account their new relationship with Israel, their dominance in the West Bank, the fact that people voted for Hamas in 2006 to punish the corruption which had engulfed Fatah rather than their political dogma and the other simple fact that there is no third alternative.
Would Fatah be the answer to all Palestinian problems? The scenario pictured is that negotiations would go a lot smoother once the legitimately elected Hamas are legally defeated. Olmert also insinuates that he can work with Abbas and his ‘moderate’ Fatah party and believes recent positive advances are signs that relations are flourishing without Hamas. These include the ‘Agreement of Principles’ as a step toward ‘final status’; the Arab delegation in Jerusalem considering the implementation of the 2002 plan of ‘normal’ relations for pre-1967 land; the release of Fatah prisoners; the agreement of Al Aqsa Brigades members to surrender their weapons in return for Israeli amnesty; Israel allowing DFLP leader Nayef Hawatmeh back into the West Bank and the contemplation of allowing the return of the Fatah-affiliated Badr Brigades currently in Jordan.
However, if Fatah is victorious and Hamas is cast out into the political wilderness, how will the secularist faction function?
Fatah, by its secularist nature has many divisional stems, unlike Hamas which is unified as one coherent entity under the common adherence to Islam. Fatah is by no means a party which has set policies and set beliefs as to where and how Palestine should go about having their own state. How does Abbas plan on controlling them?
First of all, there are the internal divisions. There is disparity in the management of administering in-party protocol and the communication strategy concerning Hamas. The viewpoint of the Fatah ‘Old Guard’, instigated by President Abbas, is that Hamas planned a ‘coup’ and dialogue should be suspended with them indefinitely. Conversely, there are the al-Mustaqbal (‘Future’) Fatah members such as Major General Jibril Rjoob who favor stricter punishment for in-party mistakes and favor dialogue. Rjoob, whose brother is a jailed member of Hamas, with the support of Egypt, is now preparing to open up talks with Hamas.
Then there is the highly influential al-Mustaqbal pioneer, imprisoned Fateh West Bank secretary Marwan Barghouti. The proclaimed Palestinian ‘Mandela’ has been pushing the need for peaceful dialogue. Some commentators have concluded that if Israel were serious about a two state ‘final status’, they would release Barghouti. However, according to Israeli standards, he is ineligible for release on account of having ‘Israeli blood on his hands’. Israel is possibly wary that the release of such an individual could usher in a Fatah struggle between the ‘Old Guard’ members such as Abbas and the new ‘Future’ direction pushed by Barghouti.
Also internally are the different branches of Fatah’s military wing, the Aqsa Brigades. Around 300 Aqsa members have now traded in their guns for Israeli amnesty and individuals who were not on the initial list have even given up their weapons in the hope that they will be considered when the list comes up for review in October. Additionally, Aqsa Brigades commander in Jenin, Zakaria Zubeidi, has stated that the brigades will not stand in the way if a solution is being compromised. However, Abu Mohammad, leader of an al-Aqsa offshoot, the Abu Ammar Brigades, has declared that ‘resisting is our legitimate right’ and that they will keep fighting Israel as long as they occupy the Palestinians. In addition there are fundamentalist Aqsa Brigades members who view Abbas as a ‘collaborator’ with Israel and the US, those who are still loyal to Yasser Arafat, those who don’t recognize Israel and those who exploit the creed and image of the group to carry out there own disruptive activities.
If Fatah wins the election and installs stability through collaboration with Israel, the entire Fatah military wing may not necessarily stay loyal to this union. There are so many sub-factions of the group that are completely detached from each other, have their own agendas and will continue to resist if their interests are jeopardized.
Externally, Abbas must also consider the consequences, if they are permitted, of having the 1,500 strong Badr Brigades operating in the West Bank as well as the introduction of PFLP and DFLP leaders with their respective groups. This ad hoc arrangement of secularist forces and their presence must not upset the balance of power.
Neither can we disregard Hamas. Even if they somehow succumb to Abbas and agree to accept his new government or even if they are driven forcibly from Gaza, Hamas will remain a significant force. Not being involved in any plans between Olmert and Abbas will only cause more hostility. Hamas has powerful backers and a coherent and cohesive ideology based upon its members’ dedication to Islamic values. These two factors combined create an ever present and formidable resistance force. With new Israeli president, Shimon Peres, stating that there is nothing to talk to Hamas about, Abbas refusing dialogue and the international community ignoring them, Hamas may have no choice but to seek further support in the arms of influential parties which will greatly delay any movements for any western-backed peace.
So, Fatah wins the election, Hamas is cast into political obscurity and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad is overwhelmed with financial support from all areas following Tony Blair’s success in repairing the Palestinian infrastructure and security system, inducing an environment of increased confidence, investment, stability and even financial prosperity. Abbas attends regular meetings with Olmert, supervised by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, which are leading to a gradual movement towards a ‘final status’.
Evidently this is a very ambitious outlook for the future, a quasi fairytale. Having said that, this is ultimately the goal and is especially a development that new Middle Eastern envoy, Tony Blair would cherish in order to avoid a triumvirate of failures in his career (the first two being Iraq / Afghanistan and the ‘Cash for Honors’ scandal).
If this is to be the case, it is imperative and of monumental importance that Abbas spends more of his time than anything else on preparing and constructing a clear and viable modus operandi policy to accommodate, cater for and include all the various eventualities that could potentially arise following the event of an election. Abbas must underestimate no one and it is imperative that he avoids the state of confusion and uncertainty apparent post January 2006. A state of dysfunctional relationships must be avoided at all costs to prevent further stagnant politics from prevailing. Only then will the Fatah led government be the ‘moderate’, unified alternative that sets the conditions and meets the prerequisites, whereby steps towards peace can no longer be ignored but seriously discussed and implemented.
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