When I think back and analyze the Oslo negotiations with regard to the task of the mediator, I recall three episodes that best describe the mission the Norwegians took upon themselves.
The first took place on the first day of our meetings. Following an official event that provided cover for the Israelis and Palestinians to come to Oslo, the Norwegians left us in the room and our host Terje Roed-Larsen said, "We'll return only if you summon us or if we hear you quarreling . . ."
The second episode happened at a farm far from the capital, where we held a prolonged discussion that went on without a break from morning into the night and the following morning. Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Jan Egeland, a man of both great abilities and broad knowledge of the Middle East, sat throughout these long hours outside the meeting room and at one point appointed himself to pour coffee and serve sandwiches. His understanding of his task was clear: make sure the negotiations proceed successfully and be available right next door as a diplomat or statesman if needed.
The third episode took place in Sweden; this was the moment when the two sides actually reached final agreement on the Oslo document. Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst arrived at the residence where Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was staying while coincidentally on an official visit to Sweden. Holst proceeded to mediate by phone a conversation that linked Peres--who was also consulting in real time with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin--with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in Tunis. It was this conversation that produced agreement regarding the few issues that had been left open by the negotiators in Oslo.
The Norwegians succeeded in 1993 because they saw the mediation task they took upon themselves as one of facilitation. They identified the strengths and weaknesses of their position, understood they had no real leverage over the negotiating parties, and did their job as successfully as one could imagine.
Yet mediation as a concept in the Middle East peace process can also find expression in different ways than those adopted by the Norwegians. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the mediation approach adopted by two American presidents, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton in Camp David. Carter was involved in the course of negotiations to the extent of helping draft documents and creating the environment that enabled the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. There is also the model of the negotiator who generates diplomatic plans and proposals for agreement. Here we recall the Swede Gunnar Jaring and the "traveling mediator" Henry Kissinger who produced the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria disengagement agreements after the 1973 war.
These and other models that were evoked in the past remain optional. The preferable model must be adapted to the emerging dynamic reality. The real question that should concern us is, what do we do in the present context with all this accumulated experience? A quick analysis of the situation leads to the conclusion that the Norwegian model won't work this time.
Back in 1993, there were two actors that both desired an interim agreement and had decided the time was ripe to risk leading their respective publics in that direction. Today, in contrast, the Israeli side is making every effort to avoid a permanent status agreement, primarily because of the territorial ramifications of a deal based on the 1967 boundaries, including Jerusalem, and the resultant need to remove many settlements. The Palestinian side is prepared to move forward and its leadership is courageous enough to do it, but the rivalry with Hamas, the West Bank-Gaza split and the increasingly extreme positions adopted in the refugee camps beyond the territories, render it difficult for the Palestinians to display the additional flexibility required of them as well in the negotiations.
The conclusion is that, this time around, the mediator's task is doubled. In the first, immediate phase, the mediator must present a peace plan for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The plan has to be drawn up and delivered by a significant international actor. The three candidates are the president of the United States, the United Nations Security Council and the Quartet.
Unlike the Quartet's roadmap of 2003, the proposal in question must deal only with the principled parameters of a final status agreement. This means a brief document that presents concepts for borders, territorial swaps, the partition of Jerusalem, issues of demilitarization and security, and a solution for the refugees. These will constitute the first foundation for negotiating final status. No more preconditions on the part of any party and no more possibility of entering negotiations with the objective of managing the conflict at the expense of ending the conflict.
In the event the two sides do enter into serious negotiations based on these principles--which looks unlikely with the present Israeli government--there will come a moment when the American president will have to join the fray as an active mediator and invite the sides to a summit dedicated to concluding negotiations. At the end of the day, without American presidential involvement that is at one and the same time enticing, threatening and decisive, there is no chance of reaching an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.
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