Former PM Fayyad's remarks to Former NSC Advisor Hadley's question on the conditions of Gaza ceasefire

Yesterday at the Atlantic Council, former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad warned that the Israeli demand for the "demilitarization" of Gaza sets “the bar too high,” adding that a ceasefire should not be
exclusively about the Rafah crossing with Egypt. Fayyad was answering a question from former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley on whether there is any possibility that the current crisis in Gaza might
facilitate a broader ending to the conflict.

Q: The Hon. Stephen Hadley

I have to make a disclosure that I had the opportunity to have lunch with Salam Fayyad and Ziad Asali today and I want to if I can, invite you to share a little about that conversation, and I recognize that there are some sensitive pieces to it, but the reason I say that is because I think there’s a lot of despair in the United States that the current situation in Gaza can lead anywhere positive, and it’s useful if you share some thoughts about that both to give some hope but also to stimulate some thinking. I’m thinking specifically, some comments you made about the kind of ceasefire that might allow both what the Israeli want, which is the demilitarization of Gaza, and what might allow Hamas to get what it wants, which is the opening of the borders for flows of goods and services. We talked a little bit about that, what kind of arrangement might permit that, the role the PA might play in that, and also the issue of reconstruction of Gaza, and how that might be structured in such a way that actually could begin not just a reconstruction process but a reform process that could begin to do what you talked about getting these institutions aligned between Gaza and the West Bank. I admit these are sensitive questions, I think what you said was very interesting and would be useful and I would just simply invite you to share portions that you’re comfortable with.

A: Former PM Fayyad:

Thank you very much. No I would be explicit on those issues, it is very important to place this in the right context in terms of how to deal with Gaza, and to begin to bring that into this course. As I said in my opening remarks, you know it’s hard to introduce strategic thinking into the policy debate in time of crisis, but in this particular case I think bringing that forward may help in facilitating agreement on a ceasefire, if people begin to really get a sense of what is going to follow afterwards. Notwithstanding the divergence, which are obvious, in terms of the demands and expectations. Take for example what you said about demilitarization of Gaza, I’d say that would be a tall order now. Gaza was not demilitarized even when the Israeli Army was there, you know minus the rockets there was just about everything else, including the tunnels. This is a reality. So for someone else to come out and say, you know Gaza should be demilitarized as a condition for a ceasefire, that’s really setting the bar too high. No agreement to ceasefire is possible. Death, injury, misery, epidemics as a consequence of no water, the power plant having been you know, bombed, and water stations and the rest of it, it’s just simply unrealistic I mean, and the rest of the demands, there is you know the Palestinian side the legitimate demand and expectation for lifting the siege on Gaza.

One really needs to separate issues here. Rafah is a key point. There’s a lot of focus on Rafah, but I argue but I think it’s important to take Rafah out of the discussion, not completely out of the discussion, but not to make the debate on access exclusively what to do about Rafah. Rafah now is a bilateral issue, for Egypt and Palestine to resolve, and I think all along the idea, I mean post 2007 is not what the case used to be, after 2007 it became exclusively a Palestinian Egyptian issue. I think it’s important, but even before, and I think really it should have happened before, you know nobody really needs to get to escalation or anything like this you know, to really solve a problem of access across Rafah. That was outstanding before, it should have been dealt with before, in discussion between Palestinians and Egyptians. The solution to it, even at time of separation before the national government would have been to open a subject to it being run and managed by the Palestinian side by the Palestinian Authority, something that really made sense even at time of separation. It would have brought the PA back into Gaza for the first time since June 2007, important something to build on. It could have paved the way, for formation of nationality government afterwards. But to begin with something basic, something as basic as that, didn’t happen. It should be approached this way, but should not mask the need for resolution of access issues elsewhere.

Rafah matters for sure, but from our point of view as Palestinians, opening Gaza northward, connecting it with the West Bank, is strategically a lot more important. Rafah should be open, as a subject of a matter of discussion between Palestine and Egypt, but what about northward access? Wouldn’t excessive focus on Rafah alone end up pushing Gaza southward, or in the direction of becoming a stand-alone entity forever, and what would that do to the Palestinian cause, to the cause of peace in the region, to the two state solution concept? It’s something that requires immediate attention, never happened before, it should happen, but that should not be something about  “ceasefire or no ceasefire”. A ceasefire is absolutely necessary. Then that discussion needs to begin. Egypt needs to say: in order for my national security interest to be protected and safeguarded, the following arrangements should be respected at Rafah crossing. I think Palestinian side would be more than willing to accommodate. The state-like structure of Palestinian side, meaning the Palestinian authority and State of Palestine, and now that there is unity even though it’s not deep enough, it has not taken root, it should happen, regardless of what happens elsewhere, but the discussion of access is absolutely important.

But then again at this moment what can happen to immediately change the landscape, history tells us and experience tells us that it takes time for this to happen. You need to really secure the ceasefire, but you need to give people sense of what is going to come later. Short of demilitarization, and again if you really could have everything you’d have everything, this is natural, this is what economics is about, but we can’t, you have to make choices. Here is a proposition: you’re looking at a situation where the State of Israel is demanding demilitarization. I don’t think that’s really realistic, I don’t think it’s really in the cards. Again, they were not able to achieve this even when they were in Gaza itself. Let’s face it, what kind of nonsense is this, to insist on that being a condition for a ceasefire? That doesn’t work. But short of that, what if there is serious consideration of a promise of a period of calm, with total commitment by consensus, by everybody on the Palestinian side? It’s not the ultimate objective; we surely look forward to the State of Palestine to be one that is really based on coexistence and total respect for agreements, and renouncing violence, and to assume a position of non-belligerence vis-à-vis anyone, including State of Israel, post-independence. But in the run-up to that, what if we can commit everybody on the Palestinian side to a time-bound commitment of period of calm? That’s not demilitarization that’s surely better than the existing situation. That is why I say we really need to look at the situation.

Unfortunately it’s not a choice between good and bad, it’s a choice between better or worse, but in this particular case, I would say, given the horror of it, it’s time to really have number one a ceasefire, number two the promise of period of calm. That’s better than not having anything, short of what Israel says it really would like to see happen, but it gets things going. It requires a greater role for the Palestinian Authority, one in which it really has presence in Gaza, not of the kind that has happened post-unification, which really has not happened, it’s not deep enough, it’s formalistic if you will so far, what really we need is for a government that really actually fully and adequately represents, one that is inclusive, one that is seriously supported by the factions, but one that can gain strength, and presence, possibly in a way that could make it an effective player. Remember, that was part of the thinking in terms of what the Palestinian government was supposed to do, going back to the road map. An empowered Palestinian government, this is not a small issue. This is something that gives opportunity for people to be included, and I prefer for it personally to be inclusive of factions themselves, in order for it to really be adequately supported by them. This is a time of national crisis, I will be honest with you, that does require commitment to non-violence of the kind that would give everyone the time needed to rebuild, to unify, but at the same time to agree with Israel and the world on a date certain for ending the occupation. Absent that, that we can’t really push on the domestic front, with the international front left undealt with. Something like this I think would be necessary.