Is there going to be a "third intifada"? I have no idea. That is a question most likely to be determined by those who set Palestinian strategy and they will surely differ among themselves. What interests me is the basis upon which such a choice would be made.

When this issue is discussed publicly, it is attributed almost entirely to the idea that frustration will motivate revolt. This is certainly the point made by Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization leaders. The argument is that unless they get their way diplomatically, violence will be the logical outcome.

But that's just a tactic to use violence as leverage, scaring western countries--because such threats won't scare Israel--into concessions. Moreover, since western countries will not hand the PLO unilateral independence on its own terms, without any deal with Israel or concessions, violence would ultimately either be useless or talk of violence would turn out to be a bluff.

There are other considerations that will determine Palestinian policy.

Would a third intifada actually bring Palestinian gains? I would argue that neither of the first two did, though of course that didn't stop them from happening. Political profitability is not the only factor involved and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat had his own way of assessing the balance of forces. But whether violence would bring any benefit is going to be an important issue for the Palestinian leadership.

Why would the leadership launch a new war if it didn't expect rationally to gain from it? Ideological enthusiasm and irrational wishful thinking do play some part here. Yet the current leadership has had some lessons in the cost of wrecking its own infrastructure. That kind of thinking in itself is insufficient.

There's another point that must be raised. Would a third intifada and the wrecking of Palestinian infrastructure once again enhance or destroy the PA and Fateh dominance on the West Bank? Demagoguery about heroic fighters, martyrdom, and liberating Palestine by fire and sword has proven to be useful for building mass support.

Yet that has usually been true when Fateh, through the PLO, had a monopoly on violence or when Hamas was content to play second fiddle to Arafat. Those conditions no longer apply.

On the other hand, however, wouldn't Hamas, with its greater degree of specialization in terror and triumphalism be in a better position to benefit? After all, Fateh does rule the West Bank and provoking anarchy and chaos could destroy its standing. By having to cooperate with Hamas, Fateh would legalize Hamas' institutions and actions, allowing it to heap new glory on itself by murdering Israeli civilians. That is very risky.

In contrast, Fateh would gain nothing in the Gaza Strip, which would stay firmly under Hamas control. Small Fateh groups might be able to operate there, but so what? They would have no political influence and be under the thumb of Hamas. A third intifada is politically beneficial to Hamas and that is a point that no Fateh or PA leader can easily ignore.

More likely, then, is a situation in which either Hamas forces the outbreak of an uprising or some leaders in Fateh do so. The latter's motivations would include a genuine belief in revolutionary methods, which a significant sector of the Fateh leadership does accept, or the use of an intifada as part of a leadership struggle.

The fact is that Fateh and PLO leader Mahmoud Abbas is in the closing phase of his leadership and there is no clear successor. Complicating the situation is the spectre of a generational transition. People can put forward in conversation their preferred person to lead the PA, PLO, and Fateh or speculate as to who it might be. But the truth is that nobody has the least idea, even regarding the identity of the most likely candidates.

A leader or faction or elements of the "young guard" might well decide that an intifada would suit their purposes. It would distance them from the "failed" policies of Abbas and the current establishment. By focusing on youth, violence, and the security forces, such a strategy could benefit a takeover bid by "military" officials or by young anti-establishment forces.

There is a difference between those two sectors. The PA "military" tends to dislike Hamas, but those who came of political age in the first intifada see things differently. They might view a war as the best way to fuse Fateh-Hamas cooperation with themselves taking a leading role.

Of course, an uprising could take place due to some major or symbolic incident, forcing the leaders to rush to the front of the army. That is also possible. But least likely of all would be Abbas and the current leadership making a calculated decision to launch a war that they expect to gain from.