The question of whether we are on the verge of another uprising is a difficult one that nobody can really answer--not political analysts, not Israel's security services nor the decision makers of the Palestinian factions Fateh and Hamas that appear to have the button at their fingertips. The query raises more questions than answers, in fact.

Second, the answer to the question, "Is another uprising on the way?" leads to other less controversial questions such as, "Are there things pushing the Palestinian people towards a third intifada?" Indeed, what is the definition of intifada and can one even talk about a third intifada without evaluating the first and the second? Lastly, will the nature of the next intifada be broad and popular and adopt a generally non-violent approach, or will it be solely violent?

There are more difficult and perplexing questions such as, "What is the impact of the sharp division between Fateh and Hamas and the absence of the Palestinian left? Will the uprising be directed solely at Israel and its occupation? What will be the impact of the so-called 'Arab spring' on any substantial Palestinian movement? How will the regional and international map--and we are on the threshold of a new phase with the possibility of a strike on Iran, a more effective role for Russia and the repercussions of the global financial crisis--affect Palestinians and their cause?"

There really is no need to look deeply into the reasons that might push the Palestinian people to a step of this kind. The standstill in the political process and negotiations with Israel are obvious. The Oslo agreement was supposed to end its transitional period in 1999 (in other words, Palestinians were to establish their own state that year). Not only did the process not work, but it made the situation much worse. Since 1993, Israel has used the "peace process" to create irreversible new facts on the ground, facts that have affected tremendously the possibility of establishing even a vulnerable and weak Palestinian state. Among these are the Judaization of Jerusalem and the West Bank, the doubling of the number of settlers there, the establishment of the separation wall, the internal transfer of the population and so on. Today we are witnessing a settler orgy, with the Israeli government being complicit or--at best--turning a turned blind eye. Thus, we have come to the conclusion that the goal of the state is no longer attainable. The foundations of the state are not even on the list of demands. We have arrived at the end. We have reached an impasse and there is no way out except through an explosion.

Since 1920, Palestinians have resisted the Judaization of their country. Sometimes this has taken the form of waves of anger and public protest. Many of these waves have been called "uprisings" ("habat") or "intifadas", but the first intifada of 1987 alone is worthy of that name. This is not only because it included the full spectrum of people--the rich and poor, children and the elderly, women and men, city residents and villagers and camp refugees--but also because it took the lead in emanating new forms of struggle characterized by broad social interaction, decentralized decision-making and the power of the civilian over that of the armed fighter.

Previous descriptions of the first intifada--those that are comprehensive and objective--lead me to say here that the essence of this uprising lasted only for the first six months or at most a year. After that, it was hijacked by opportunists and Israeli repression and even used to further the destruction of Palestinian society.

A fundamental difference exists between the first intifada of the Palestinian people and the so-called "second intifada". This difference was reflected in forms of participation, events, geography, and outcomes, which need not be explored here. What are controversial are the reasons for the difference. There is one main component (among others, of course) that was not present in the first intifada but was there in the second uprising and persists today: the Palestinian Authority. Palestinians see the Palestinian Authority as the first phase in their transitional state-building period. The Palestinian Authority was never a Palestinian goal in itself; the state was the ultimate goal. The Israelis, however, have succeeded in creating a sense within the Palestinian Authority that its survival is linked to its security role. This certainly was not what the late Yasser Arafat wanted when he signed the Oslo agreement. Added to this today is a factor that was not present at the outbreak of the second intifada, which is the division between Fateh and Hamas and the existence of two separate Palestinian entities, one in the West Bank and the other in the Gaza Strip.

The outcome is that the Palestinian national and Islamist movements are caught in the trap of an authority that does not carry in its womb the new life of a state, as sought after by Fateh and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and is unable to accomplish freedom through resistance, as demanded by Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Thus, this authority has become an obstacle to statehood and resistance alike--and is also an obstacle to any new uprising. Moreover, the new political economy of Palestinian society is not able to bear a fresh intifada, as tens of thousands of individuals are now bound and enslaved by policies of credit that keep them busy trying to repay their loans every month.

In closing, one observes that many of the current forms of resistance against Israel's occupation reflect the features of the condition of the Palestinian public. Grassroots and popular activity comes at the initiative of individuals and groups distant from any central leadership organization. This activity could mean that a new "people power" will eventually figure prominently in the conflict's equation. But until this third way is actualized and as long as the Arabs remain powerless despite the Arab spring, Israel can rest easy.