The Obama administration policy in the Middle East vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict is starting to become clearer, but remains mostly unclear. It is clearer because of recent moves on such matters as the Richard Goldstone report on the Gaza war or the pressure on Israel to freeze settlements, but it would be a mistake to jump to conclusions and assume that the Obama Middle East policy is quickly reverting to the traditional American default position of being in Israel’s pocket. It is too early to judge the United States here, and we should not make the mistake of passing judgment on a policy that is still in the making.

My talks with knowledgeable Washington experts who are involved with the administration and follow it closely suggest to me that the Obama team is much more methodical and strategic in its thinking than any other recent American administration, with a strong focus on pushing for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace as a high foreign-policy priority. This does not seem to be coupled, however, with a detailed work plan on how to get from A to B and finally to a full peace.

The sharp, swift and sustained American focus on the total freezing of Israeli settlements has been a highly unusual move for the US in the Middle East – but also an indicator that Obama is not moving whimsically or aimlessly. Yet it is also not moving with any success, either. The initial articulation of American policy – engage deeply, freeze Israeli settlements, secure Arab gestures of acceptance of Israel, and go for a comprehensive deal – has quickly encountered its first bumps in the road. The American response and next steps remain totally unclear.

There is no consensus among specialists in the US over what is the Obama strategy and how will he respond to the initial bumps– Israel’s refusal to freeze all settlements, and the Arabs’ refusal to make the gestures of acceptance to Israel before it makes substance expressions of its will to coexist peacefully with a Palestinian state. The Obama team has responded with unusual but probably appropriate reticence, neither throwing in the towel and giving up, nor blaming either side for the stalemate and pressuring them to accept ultimatums.

Obama knew that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his extremist right-wing government would resist the total settlement freeze, so why did he insist so absolutely? What will he do now? He risks making Washington lose face and credibility if he backs off in the face of Israeli stonewalling; he also risks being a one-term president and failing on some of his other major policy initiatives if he pushes too hard and instigates the pro-Israel lobby groups in the US to fight him on domestic issues as well as in the Middle East.

The most reasoned analysis I have heard from knowledgeable people in Washington who work with the Obama team is that the administration will continue patiently to chart the outlines of what it feels is needed to move toward a negotiated peace, while reacting slowly and patiently to events on the ground – all the time pushing Arabs and Israelis toward launching a serious negotiation. That negotiating moment is not now, because neither the Palestinian nor Israeli government is in any shape to negotiate seriously, or to make the substantive concessions required on both sides to seal a deal.

Naivete has always been part of American policy, as we saw in the juxtaposition of the demand to freeze Israeli settlements with the demand that Arab states make gestures of recognition toward Israel. A better approach would have been to demand that Israel stop an illegal and immoral act – colonization – and also ask the Arabs to stop an equally unacceptable act, like, say, terrorism against civilians, incitement against Judaism, or Holocaust denial.

The Obama administration is focused on a medium-term strategy to push for a comprehensive peace agreement, but at the same time it is also learning about how diplomacy happens in the Middle East. We are still in the phase of Obama’s education in the region, rather than any serious expenditure of American political capital to move from conversations and explorations to actual negotiations.

I would expect realistically that by early next year – with Obama pocketing some domestic and foreign policy successes, the Palestinians getting their house in order and electing a new leadership, the Israelis learning that the US is serious about comprehensive peace-making, and the Arab states doing something more significant than being idle spectators – we may see the full contours of an American policy on Arab-Israeli peacemaking, rather than the warm-up strides now taking place.

Or we may see a new war, one that is much more destructive than any that has come before.