It's been two years since Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip, and it seems as if the breach between Gaza and the West Bank - or between what has been dubbed "Fatahland" and "Hamastan" - has never been wider. More than 700 Hamas members are imprisoned in Palestinian Authority jails in the West Bank, whereas several hundred Fatah loyalists are kept in Hamas' detention facilities in Gaza. In June 2007, as Hamas launched its takeover of Gaza, clashes between the two organizations claimed the lives of 158 Palestinians, mostly Fatah members. Since then about 100 Gazans have been killed in intra-Palestinian clashes - again, mostly from Fatah. Last month's shoot-out between PA security forces and Hamas members in Qalqilyah was a watershed in the relations between the two groups in the West Bank.

Yet, there could be rapprochement. Egypt is planning to hold an event on July 7 to mark the achievement of Palestinian reconciliation. The event is to be attended by representatives of all the organizations, including Hamas political leader Khaled Meshal and PA President Mahmoud Abbas. Only a few months ago the Egyptians were despairing about the possibility of bringing the two sides together, but U.S. President Barack Obama's recent visit to Eypt rejuvenated their efforts.

In his speech at Cairo University, Obama clarified that his attitude toward Hamas differs from that of his predecessor. In Hamas, at least among the more moderate leaders, this was seen as an opportunity to break the diplomatic siege on the organization. The Egyptians understood that Washington expects Cairo to secure an internal Palestinian reconciliation as a good-will gesture to Obama, and to pave the way for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.
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The day before Obama's speech, a leading Egyptian official told Haaretz that his government had decided to bring about a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation by July 7. If these efforts fail, Egypt's image will also suffer.

The prevailing assessment in Egyptian intelligence is that Hamas' political leadership is interested in reconciliation - and soon. It is the Islamic group's military wing, headed by Ahmed al-Jabari, and its officials in Damascus, that are the problem. This is why the Egyptians insist that Syria and Iran must pressure Hamas' external leadership to agree to Palestinian unity. Since the Iranians are currently preoccupied with their own problems, Syria is increasingly becoming a key player in the Palestinian arena.

Obama and his officials realize that an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is dependent upon unity between the West Bank and Gaza - which is why they are aware of Syria's central role. This realization may well have paved the way for the White House's decision this week to return the American ambassador to Syria - a gesture intended to prompt Damascus to pressure Meshal and his ilk to agree to the Egyptian-proposed reconciliation with Fatah.

The price of order

Gaza has never experienced the kind of order that prevails there today. Hamas is imposing its control, and even the smallest organizations are afraid of firing Qassam rockets at Israel. The era of fauda, the chaos, imposed on Gazans by armed gangs and large clans, has ended.

For the first time in many years, drivers are obeying traffic rules and stoplights, and the coffee houses are staying open until late at night. The West Bank has undergone a similar process under the leadership of the PA security forces. Many Gazans believe that the current situation in the Strip is immeasurably better than it was under PA rule, when armed militias roamed the streets. The Dormush clan, for example, used to offer its services for hire - charging $100 for four armed men per day. Hamas dealt with the large clans, including the Dormushes and members of the Hilas family, who were identified with Fatah - although during Hamas' takeover of the Strip they helped the organization fight Fatah activists identified with Mohammed Dahlan.

However, the order imposed by Hamas is also exacting a price. Though Gaza's beaches are packed with swimmers, there is no freedom of association, expression or protest. Fatah activists are arrested and persecuted. Hamas is enforcing its laws by means of a reign of terror. In the best-case scenario it is arresting and torturing regime opponents, and in the worst case, executing them. The fact that Hamas has become the "establishment," imposing law and order, has resulted in the rise of ultra-radical groups, of the Al-Qaida sort. These groups are now the only alternative to Hamas, which has lost something of its aura of "resistance" from the PA's heyday.

In an attempt to forget about the great economic distress, thousands of Gazans have become addicted to painkillers, the most popular drugs today in the Strip. Indeed, the catastrophic economic situation may be the main problem facing Hamas. Ahead of January's Operation Cast Lead, the organization had promised Gazans that the rocket fire at Israel would lead the latter to lift its siege on the Strip. But that did not happen.

To this day, the PA pays most salaries in the Gaza Strip, sending wages to several thousand government employees who served there when the PA was in control and now have been ordered to stay home from work. The prisoners whose release Hamas promised after Gilad Shalit's abduction are also still sitting in Israeli prisons.

Hamas would like to forget all about Operation Cast Lead. Although it claimed "victory" when the war ended, it is now clear that Hamas failed to obtain any of its aims, and also has had to prevent other groups from firing rockets for fear of a harsh Israeli reprisal. However, the movement is not trying to keep these smaller groups from taking action along the border fence.

Despite Israel's economic siege, Hamas continues to operate numerous tunnels under the border with Egypt, in order to amend several shortages - cash, merchandise and fuel. Even cement is being smuggled through the tunnels. In addition, the organization is continuing to smuggle in short-range and long-range rockets to rehabilitate its military capability.

The "tunnel project" inside Gaza itself is also in full swing: Hamas is digging tunnels throughout the Strip to prepare for the next Israeli invasion; it is also considering using them to abduct soldiers and launch attacks Israeli forces.

Internal power struggles

Several thousand men make up Hamas' military wing, and 18,000 to 20,000 Gazans belong to its government security forces. The organization has also established a special force for suppressing riots, in the case of a popular uprising. Since its takeover of the Strip, Hamas' military wing has grown steadily stronger - as seen by the fact that three senior movement members identified with the Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Ahmad al-Jabari, Nizar Awadallah and Marwan Issa) were invited to Cairo for talks on Gilad Shalit's release. By contrast, only one member of the group's political leadership (Mahmoud al-Zahar) was asked to attend.

Several leaders of Hamas' military wing were recently elected to the organization's Shura Council, while moderates were shunted aside. Contrary to the position of the external leadership, the military wing spearheaded the Gaza takeover, the same military wing that is anything but keen to accept Egypt's proposals for conciliation and conceding control over the Strip. While the Brigades are in favor of reconciliation with Fatah, they will not accede unconditionally. Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, a member of the more pragmatic camp, is not considered to be the organization's main decision-maker, although he is definitely part of the leading political echelon.

Hamas' top decision-maker has been and remains Meshal, who controls its budget - and therefore also has an influence over the tension between Gaza and Damascus. Thus, the decision concerning reconciliation lies in the hands of those who are neither feeling nor seeing the Gazans' distress. Several times already the Egyptians mediating between Hamas and Fatah have been astonished to discover the real extent of the differences between top Hamas officials from abroad and their peers in Gaza. And so, two years after Hamas took over Gaza, its internal power struggles continue to impede Palestinian reconciliation. It is highly doubtful that these disagreements will be resolved by July 7.