The American-Israeli strategic partnership differs from any other one. Usually when a great power grants protection and strategic guarantees - not to mention massive economic help - to a minor partner, the latter is eager to satisfy its protector's demands. During the Cold War it would have been impossible for Germany to reject Washington's requirements on a major issue. Germans were too frightened to see a weakening of the United States' strategic umbrella against the Soviet Union. The same goes for Japan. Whatever the differences of perception between Tokyo and Washington, at the end of the day Tokyo would follow the American path. Nothing that might trigger the erosion of US military support for Japan would unfold.

The link between Tel Aviv and Washington does not follow this general rule. When Israel and the United States disagree, most of the time it is the Americans who yield their initial positions, not Israel. In the bilateral relationship, the small state seems to be stronger than the "hyper power". One British expert had even written after the Iraq War that the "special relationship" which was London's diplomatic motto was over, and while Britain has lost any kind of influence on American strategic choices, only Israel seems to be able to do so.

This general trend has deep historical and political roots. But it has never been as strong as it was during the presidency of George W. Bush.

The most spectacular example was at the end of his second mandate during the war on Gaza. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert called him on the phone. The Bush team responded that the president was unable to talk to him right now, because he was making a public speech. Olmert became furious, Bush interrupted his speech, had a conversation with Olmert who asked him to immediately change the US vote in the United Nations Security Council regarding Gaza war. Bush agreed on the spot.

Things can change in the very near future. The tensions between Tel Aviv and Washington are growing. And Obama seems not to be ready to obey every Israeli request. Actually, the diplomatic agendas of the US and Israel are different and even opposed to one another to a certain extent. And the fact that the current government is the most reactionary government in Israeli history seems to give more leverage to the American president.

Obama's strategic priority is to mend the relationship between America and the Muslim world. He knows that kind and gentle speeches on dialogue between civilisations, praise of the peaceful nature of Islam, and smiles to Arabs will not be sufficient. If any real progress - with serious short-term effects and not only some vague long-term perspectives - on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict isn't reached soon, his popularity and esteem, at the top for now, will progressively vanish. And even if the previous Israeli government did not undertake real steps towards a global solution, for the first time in 16 years the current one does not accept the very principle of a Palestinian state: It's a great leap backwards.

The other dispute is about Iran. Partly by real belief, partly for tactical reasons - in order to create a central strategic issue apart from the Palestinian conflict - the Israeli government presents Iran's nuclear programme as the main threat to international security, trying to sell the idea that a war to prevent Iran going nuclear would be less harmful than the potential consequences of Iran holding such a weapon. Israel is pushing through a military solution to destroy Iranian nuclear capacities. Obama does not buy that.

First of all he knows that he cannot afford a new war in the region, in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan. Secondly, he knows that the strategic side effects of such a war would be catastrophic, shortly after the one in Gaza, and before any solution in sight in Iraq and Afghanistan, with a growing preoccupation over Pakistan. Thirdly, he believes that Iran could be persuaded to abandon the military aspects of its nuclear programme by negotiations and compensation without resorting to military strikes. And last but not the least, he needs Iran's positive attitude in order to find an acceptable solution in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Therefore there is a growing gap between Israeli and American strategic priorities and Israel could be mistaken for believing that its views will prevail once again.