Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is no political rookie. Nor is US President Barack Obama bereft of a battery of advisers with experience on how to deal with Israel. One expects that both will try to avoid a showdown as much as possible even if for different reasons.

Netanyahu is due to visit the United States in May and the outlines of his

approach are not yet clear. But according to Israeli press reports he will offer a multi-tier set of conditions for "progress" on the political track with the Palestinians. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reported recently before the US Congress that progress is a condition equally placed by Arab governments for cooperation on the Iranian "nuclear threat," a message that was also meant for the new Israel government.

One can therefore expect Netanyahu's approach to be "yes, but." Several conditions will be placed, including linking Iran to Palestine. Progress on one front will have to precede progress on the other front. This will be the first spanner thrown in the path of political progress.

There are two other Israeli conditions one can foresee: a gradual normalization with Arab countries, thus inverting the Arab initiative that tied normalization to the resolution of the conflict; and "economic" negotiations with Palestinians

to "prepare" the ground for political progress. Progress on the political front

is therefore the last stage in a long drawn-out process that is not likely to see the light of day.

It should be obvious that such conditions will not be acceptable to Arab governments and the Palestinian Authority. But will they be acceptable to the Obama administration? The issue here obviously is not one of preference but rather one contingent upon the relative strengths of each side. Netanyahu is banking on two sources of strength: internally, the attempt to set conditions that resonate with a majority of Israelis; externally, what the pro-Israel lobby in the US can successfully advocate.

In Washington, Netanyahu's focus is obviously on the US Congress - which Newt Gingrich famously described as Israeli-occupied territory - and what Congress can do, especially the Republicans who in any case are in the opposition and have already begun attacking the Obama administration for domestic reasons even before his first 100 days were over. "Israel's security" - now an ultimate justification for policies that requires no argumentation, rationalization or discussion beyond what the Israel lobby says - is another "trump card" that Netanyahu will seek to provide a majority in Congress with.

The question then becomes to what degree the Obama administration can overcome such obstacles. This is contingent upon its ability to neutralize the pressure of the pro-Israel lobby and that of Congress and generate support in influential circles in the US for US national interests as against those of the special interests of Netanyahu's right-wing government.

It has been argued that the internal Palestinian division between Ramallah and Gaza is an impediment to a political settlement. This is actually a false argument for two reasons. First, Hamas leaders have said on more than one occasion that they will accept a two-state solution predicated on a 20 or even 30-year truce. Effectively, the Palestinian Authority's political program is no different from that of Hamas, given what a "30-year truce" means in the regional and international context. It should be obvious that a fait accompli could be established that is unlikely to be reversed.

Second, the political "weakness" of the Palestinian Authority is the result of a lack of accomplishments in progress toward the two-state solution. The Palestinian Authority's strength vis-ˆ-vis Hamas, and the balance of power between the two, hinges on such accomplishments. If the Palestinian Authority succeeds in its endeavor and reaches an agreement that establishes a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza along lines accepted by a majority of Palestinians, it will regain the upper hand over Hamas and can put such an agreement to a plebiscite. With Arab and international support for such an agreement, Palestinians will most likely be supportive.

The problem is that the Palestinian Authority has not been an effective political actor so far. Nor have Arab governments. Therefore, we have to watch the drama that is beginning to unfold in the test of wills between the new Israeli Cabinet and the Obama administration. All bets are open.