New York - Indulging extremism and adapting to it is not in the interest of the US, nor is it favorable to the future of the Middle East. What is meant here is not Islamic extremism alone, but also Jewish extremism, as it characterizes Israel's inclinations during the present phase. It is thus necessary for President Barack Obama to demand that the members of his cabinet, his envoys and his advisers place before him a comprehensive strategy, one that addresses the challenges of Israeli, Arab and Iranian extremism, not in order to temporarily absorb radicalism, but rather to effectively and comprehensively support moderation, reform, modernity and justice. It is necessary for the forces of moderation, especially amongst Arabs, to formulate a rational strategy of their own as well, one that would drive their stances forward at the local, regional, US and international levels.

Such a strategy should not be exclusively political, but rather one in which economy and politics would complement each other, and in which measures for internal reform, social as well as political and economic, would be taken without delays or prevarication. Indeed, moderates should not be afraid to wage the war against extremism with a serious vision based on local responsibility and international partnership. They must rush to formulate a detailed and comprehensive view of the ideology of moderation and the standing of political secularism in non-extremist rule. The opportunity is now ripe to influence the political direction that will be taken not just by the new US President, but also by the global partnerships his policies will produce, especially with countries such as China and Russia, in addition to how these partnerships will reflect on regional conflicts.

Indeed, President Obama seems eager for policies that would reflect his character and his thinking. However, he is clear about listening not just to the advice of political experts but also to that of seasoned generals. Hence it is important to contribute to putting forth issues, stances, opinions and strategies before him, instead of remaining in the corner of waiting and predictions, behind the door of frustration and disappointment.

President Obama seems ready to launch a new policy to resolve regional conflicts, starting from Afghanistan, one that relies on civilian/military strategy, such as an influx of hundreds of US diplomats into Afghanistan coinciding with preparations to move 17 thousand troops to gradually build a greater and longer military presence, the goals of which would be broader than the area of Afghanistan alone.

Military and political experts describe this military plan not as a policy of reinforcing military presence in preparation for withdrawal, but rather as one of sending 17 thousand now, then 17 others in a few months, as part of building forces to stay.

Sending hundreds of American diplomats to Afghanistan within the framework of a policy of civilian diplomatic mobilization - by the hundreds - to accompany military mobilization - by the thousands - is an intelligent and far-sighted policy. What is new about it is that it is of the making of members of the military, not only of the making of civilians in the new administration.

President Barack Obama has made clear all the appreciation he has for US military leaders, and that he places his trust in the military high command to define US policy towards Iraq and Afghanistan, and perhaps also towards Iran, as it is the neighbor of both. It is in fact the military high command that found it beneficial to enter into partnership with the civilian aspect of US policy, this at two levels: that of US policy in zones of conflict, so as not to appear aggressive or strictly military, and that of local partnerships between US troops and local forces - civilian or non-civilian - in order to achieve goals.

The man most famous in this respect is General David Petraeus, the Commander of US Central Command, who introduced the idea of partnership with Awakening Councils in Iraq. He is one of the main pillars of US policy-making under President Obama, entrusted with the issues of Iraq and Afghanistan alongside Defense Secretary Robert Gates, knowing that the National Security Adviser is also a military man, General James Jones.

The US President may have pleased some of the political experts outside or inside his administration when he spoke of addressing the moderates amongst the Taliban in order to form a semi-partnership with them to fight the extremist radicals within the movement and perhaps also within Al-Qaeda. Members of the military, however, sat in their seats and waited patiently for the new president to start climbing downwards after having been too hasty in announcing such intent.

Some found that comparing between addressing Awakening Councils in Iraq and addressing "moderates amongst the Taliban" was complete nonsense, not only because it is wrong to liken the Awakening Councils to the Taliban as being Islamic radicalism. Militarily, it was a poor comparison, as the Awakening Councils were in dire need of partnership with US troops to save them from what they considered to be "the rule of Qom" in Iraq. As for the Taliban, they are - in their opinion - in no need of partnership or of saving, but rather are "victorious" and do not wish to compromise on their victory.

US strategy towards Afghanistan is unusual, complex and can sustain many a test. In principle, there is bitter debate over whether it would be better for the US to decide that the Taliban and what they do to the people of Afghanistan - including the atrocious violations at the humanitarian level - are none of America's business, and that what the US is concerned with is exclusively what the Taliban do in terms of globally exporting terrorism and locally sponsoring it by offering bases to Al-Qaeda and others. Those who are of this opinion are, effectively, pulling the rug from under the feet of all those who might have though that the United States had been sincere when it had believed and claimed to support moving Afghanistan to a state of normalcy and relative moderation, and to cling to the defense of human rights, and particularly not to allow what the Taliban did to women and young girls in Afghanistan to be repeated.

Those who are of this opinion today promote abandoning President Hamid Karzai, not because there is an alternative with a greater ability for reform and a greater commitment to the promised course, but rather simply because they have decided that the interest of the US requires "pragmatism". Such "pragmatism" has concluded that the US will not be able to win the war in Afghanistan nor to defeat Al-Qaeda and the likes of it through Afghanistan. Thus there is no alternative but to strike this kind of hidden deal with the Taliban on the basis of "help us - we will ignore you… challenge us - we will punish you".

Those who oppose this opinion do so not only because of its political and moral disadvantages with regards to the situation in Afghanistan, but rather because of how it reflects beyond Afghanistan - in terms of the disturbing message the US leadership would be sending on the international scene, as well as the message such a policy would send to other players of the same kind as the Taliban in different parts of the world - and of the Muslim World in particular.

The debate is bitter and in fact nearly represents a battle between the political staff among which some believed that the return of the Democrats to power would return them to the job they had started and never finished, and the political/military staff which behaves with a completely different kind of intellectual "pragmatism".

Those who promote such thinking say the following: the US will not shrink before the Taliban in Afghanistan, because Afghanistan is extremely important in new partnerships such as the partnership with Russia, and because losing the battle in Afghanistan means losing a greater war against Islamic radicalism, spread from the Caucasus to Chechnya.

They say: we will not be hasty in embracing Nawaz Sharif as a leader in Pakistan just because the lawyers are dwarfing incumbent President Zardari. The latter is indeed a bad alternative for Pervez Musharraf, but the worse alternative would be Nawaz Sharif in all of his extremism and dangerous inclinations.

They say that Pakistan today, in all that it contains and produces in terms of deep-seated fear, is not a country the United States can decide that it can do without - as is the case with Afghanistan - because the dangers of Pakistan and Afghanistan are not local but rather international.

They say: let the generals think deeply of US influence in Iraq and Afghanistan in the present and in the future, and of how it would be possible to implement the military/civilian policy to strengthen the military institution and to free the political institution. This in turn will make clear the features and choices that will dictate US policy towards Iran.

Those who think of the next phase of US policy do not base their views on removing the military option then retreating to a constrained policy towards Iran. They base them on the intelligent and rational use of military options then moving up to a realistic policy, a civilian policy and a firm policy towards Iran and the likes of it. They understand the interpenetration of political, economic and military factors in traditional and realistic strategies, based on the language of strength and greatness in the classical sense.

They understand - as one of them stated - that Russia has won the pipeline war, in reference to the gas and oil pipelines over which major powers compete, and that Russia - regardless of such a victory - is in need of the partnerships sought-after with the US in Afghanistan and towards Iran and Pakistan. They are ready for this kind of deal ("help us, we'll help you") and not for shady deals with questionable groups such as the Taliban and the so-called moderates among the ranks of extremist radicalism wherever it may be. Indeed, indulging extremism is not part of the new crew's lexicon in US policy-making, taking its depth in military/civilian strategy. Such a crew believes in the thoughts, emotions and principles of President Barack Obama, but relies on a form of realism more lucid than the pragmatism of civilians.

Afghanistan may not be directly important for the Arabs or in the strategy of the ranks of moderation, as they believe that they should focus on Palestine, Iraq and Iran, and on Arab reconciliations and disagreements before, during and after summits. Of course, such an approach is short-sighted because what US policy succeeds or fails at in Afghanistan or in Iraq has a radical impact on restraining or setting loose the Islamic Republic, especially as it is going through a transitional period, is internally unstable and is suffering economically much more than it recognizes and admits.

However, the policy of Arab moderation should not be under one headline, but rather must have a realistically all-encompassing perspective, one of audacity and not of idleness. Hence, and in view of the important development on the Israeli scene represented by eluding - or in fact rejecting the choice of the two states as a solution to be negotiated, the forces of Arab moderation must formulate a bold and offensive strategy that would show the meaning of eluding the two-state solution, and would show that the alternative choice which Israel puts on the table is the choice of ethnic cleansing aimed at establishing a pure Jewish state, devoid of all who are not Jewish. Bringing such a reality to light will in itself, with a simple and clear strategy without apologetics, fear or hesitation, be of radical help in uncovering the features and dangers of extremism, regardless of sect, religion and ideology. Indeed, extremism is the enemy and moderation should dare to wage the war against it.

The problem with moderation is that it tries to please and dreams of coexistence without a battle. The fact of the matter is that this is a war of survival and a war for the future. Moderation must now be a little extreme in order to tell those who speak pompous words that extreme moderation is the necessary partner in building a safe future, not moderate extremism, because there can be no moderation in extremism under any circumstances or by any explanation.