It is almost impossible to count the number of failed attempts made by Egypt, the Arab League, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the Palestinians themselves to resolve the strife between Fatah and Hamas. However, the current round of negotiations held in Egypt appears to be different: more appeasing, less strained.

Three major new factors may contribute this time to a more successful outcome. First, the Gaza war sharpened the understanding that there are not "two Palestines," one in the West Bank and the other in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority and President Mahmoud Abbas realized that they cannot stand aloof from what happened in Gaza, and that a war in any part of Palestine affects all the Palestinians in all parts of Palestine and abroad.

Further, from an ideological standpoint, Abbas realizes that complaints about Hamas' "misbehavior" lead him nowhere and that political "cohabitation" is the only way for him to extend his authority back into Gaza without contradicting the premise of the Oslo agreement. If he avoids cohabitation now, Abbas will be perceived as playing into the hands of Israel, which prefers to demonstrate the difference between the "happy good guys" in the West Bank and the "miserable bad guys" in Gaza. Politically, the Palestinian Authority and Fatah cannot allow themselves to be perceived to be prolonging Israel's war and siege on Gaza by adopting Israel's conditions for opening the Gaza-Israel passages.

If, prior to the war on Gaza, Abbas could maintain negotiations with Israel while describing Hamas as a renegade organization that revolted against a legitimate regime, this argument was lost after the war. Hamas has established itself as the defender of the Palestinians in Gaza, an organization that is not afraid to fight Israel and, most importantly, one that can mobilize heavily in the Arab states, dictate Arab policies and intimidate the "Arab monopoly" over the Palestinian issue by playing proxy to Iran.

Second, US President Barack Obama's policies toward the Middle East are beginning to take shape and can already be characterized as proactive dialogue. Obama intends to initiate a substantial dialogue with Iran - and not just about the situation in Iraq; he does not hesitate to reach out to Syria; and his secretary of state is all in favor of a Palestinian national-unity government that includes Hamas.

True, the new American policy comes with strings and conditions attached. Iran has to cease its uranium enrichment, Syria must stop supporting Hizbullah, and Hamas has to recognize Israel if it wants to be legitimized by the United States. Yet, unlike Bush's approach, there are no preconditions to demonstrating goodwill: American senators visited Syria, and two administration officials are set to do so soon; Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry visited Gaza; and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the donor states conference in Sharm al-Sheikh and will contribute some $900 million to reconstruction in Gaza.

No distribution apparatus has been set up for that purpose. But all parties involved, including the Palestinian Authority, the Arab donors and the Western states understand that without Hamas there will be no reconstruction. Likewise, it is well understood by Hamas that without reconciliation with Fatah it will be very difficult to reap the fruits of war and demonstrate to the Palestinian public that its losses were not in vain. Hence Hamas needs the Palestinian Authority as much as Salam Fayyad's government needs Hamas.

The third factor is the outcome of the Israeli elections and the rise of the right and extreme right to power. Judging from Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu's declarations thus far, his rejection of the "two states" formula for solving the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and his lack of enthusiasm for restarting negotiations with Syria imply again that at least the Palestinian side will be better off united rather than divided. Palestinian unity will deny Netanyahu the ability to play one Palestinian party against the other without being obliged to get involved in meaningful negotiations.

Yet even from an Israeli point of view, and especially according to Netanyahu's policy, a united Palestinian government is the preferred choice. Without a viable peace process, with no Israeli intention to withdraw from the West Bank and given Netanyahu's pretension to be able to work closely with the new American administration, he needs a Palestinian partner with which to manage the conflict. The Palestinian Authority as currently constituted will not suffice for that purpose, nor will it be a willing partner on its own.

Managing the conflict rather than solving it is probably the most the new Israeli government can deliver and the American administration can hope for. It is also the maximum the Arab states expect from the Cairo talks and the most achievable common denominator for Fatah and Hamas. Such an understanding does not demand mutual recognition between Hamas and Israel. It can provide a workable framework for developing an economic and political infrastructure for the Palestinian state to come.

The logic of the situation points to reconciliation. Let's see if logic can prevail this time.

Zvi Bar'el is the Middle East analyst of Haaretz daily. This commentary first appeared in bitterlemons.org, an online newsletter.