There is increasing talk of intelligence information about an alleged dispute within the regime in Damascus; some intelligence information even refers to indicators implying that the Syrian regime is willing to accept proposals. A few take this information seriously and encourage responsiveness to any indicators heralding a potential positive change, especially if such change weakens certain figures associated with intelligence activities. Those embracing this view believe that responsiveness can save Syria from collective punishment. On the other hand, there is another camp with a completely different opinion, arguing that the regime is coherent and cohesive and that those messages and indicators claimed to be intelligence are in fact information propagated by the regime itself to distract others, buy time, target Lebanese institutions, and play on Arab fears. Regardless of what lies behind all this talk, the intelligence quasi-wars that accompany it in the region are carrying fears to a completely new level. Some even warn against an "intelligence free hand" among countries and within particular states. The assassination of Imad Mughniyyeh, Hezbollah's military official in Damascus, has raised a series of assumptions and expectations about retaliatory attacks by Hezbollah and Iran. Being the battlefield for wars-by-proxy, Lebanon is likely to pay the price.

It was the development of the relationship between Syria, Iran and Hezbollah immediately after news of the assassination came out that caught attention, especially the intelligence talk about the links between Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda through Mughniyyeh, and Israel's plans to instigate retaliatory wars with Hezbollah to regain the reputation of "victory" it lost in the July War in Lebanon. These developments came at a time when the Lebanese majority was confirming its choice for the state and its institutions as it gathered over a million demonstrators on a rainy day to say: No to the rule of the militia! We will not fear you or those behind you - be they in Damascus or Tehran. We are with the rule of the state. All this also coincided with clarifications made by all US presidential candidates and the current US administration regarding their position towards Lebanon, confirming absolute support for the international tribunal and denying the possibility of using it as a bargaining chip. This also clearly indicated that the candidates have begun to understand Lebanon's importance in the decisive battles of the Middle East.

Arab leaderships are still searching for the compass needle in their relationship with Damascus despite their full awareness that they will not find it. A few of these are speaking the language of bilateral interests and the need to influence the regime in Damascus to uproot it from the Iranian lap. Others have concluded that it is futile to try to change Syrian behaviors and objectives, whether with Iran or Lebanon and Palestine. These fear the ramifications and outcomes of the status of Damascus as a hub for cooperation or conflict among intelligence agencies and their organizations which may or may not fall under the authority of states. Damascus' remarkable standing as host to organizations and intelligence agencies is not recent. Damascus has always used this distinction as an asset to forge its regional and international relations. It has always assumed that its influence goes beyond its state borders and accordingly worked on manipulating its Lebanese, Palestinian and Iraqi neighbors to prove its regional status that would make superpowers take it seriously.

A few Arab leaders believe that they can lure Damascus into cooperating and heeding Arab demands with the "carrots" of investment, funds and the ending of Arab and international isolation. These few feel that the Arab "carrot" is inevitable, especially with the absence of a serious American "stick" in Damascus's face as a result of the Israeli veto. According to Washington, the Syrian regime remains a safety gauge against an Islamic or nationalist regime that may activate military resistance on the Syrian-Israeli front. The obstacle facing these Arab leaders wishing to lure Damascus is the impossibility to reach an agreement over the central problem and primary issue in Syrian eyes, i.e. Lebanon. Their luring efforts are not solely hindered because of Syrian demands but also because the most attractive "carrot" has already slipped out of Arab hands.

The Syrian leadership has never wanted anything so badly as for the international tribunal for the Hariri assassins and the other political assassinations to go away, especially as the investigation may prove Damascus's involvement in this terrorist crime, as described by the UN Security Council that passed the resolution to form the tribunal. All the pillars and foundations to this tribunal have been installed and it has now become an "irreversible" and "irrevocable" reality, as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Mon said. The tribunal broke the typical pattern of negotiation, bargaining and stalling, thus vaporizing the Syrian dreams. According to a senior Arab official, the international tribunal is no longer a clause or a condition in Syrian talks with Arab and Western leaderships. The Syrian government has reached the conclusion that the current phase demands refraining from discussing the tribunal - until further notice - after the realization that it has lost the battle to obstruct the tribunal. This does not mean giving in to the tribunal as a fait accompli, especially since the international investigation leaked two years ago the names of senior Syrian officials suspected of involvement in Hariri's assassination.

Syria's terms revolve at this stage, according to the same senior Arab official, around the future of rule in Lebanon. Arabs want Syria to stop obstructing the presidential elections in Lebanon and to give its allies the green light to end the presidential void. The Syrian leadership wants to host the Arab summit next month in Damascus to break its isolation and it wants attendance by the largest number of Arab leaders possible. Consequently, it may facilitate the presidential elections but with impossible conditions.

What Damascus wants now is to tie the hands of the government in exchange for releasing the presidential elections. It wants a paralyzed cabinet that has no capacity to govern. It wants guarantees for Hezbollah's safety and no discussion of its arms or its acting as a state within a state. It also wants none of the international resolutions aiming at disarming the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and organizations implemented. On top of this, it wants to continue marginalizing Lebanon's democratic institutions persistently and radically, and while it offers Arabs its good faith, it seeks to undermine the institutions that guarantee Lebanon's independence. Damascus wants the resistance to continue from Lebanon, not from the Golan Heights. It wants guarantees against the settlement of the Palestinians to avoid shaking the sectarian balance. It wants to keep Lebanon its hostage without peace until it finalizes its peace with Israel. Damascus still thinks in terms of possessing Lebanon and demands Arab acknowledgment of what it considers its "privileged right" to continuously tame the Lebanese "brother" and to use it as a strategic core and a backyard for the activity of its terror- and intelligence-linked organizations.

In Lebanon, Syria has what it considers essential extensions to the so-called "concept of resistance," which in reality is nothing but the promotion of organizations and militias that include Palestinian factions opposing the Palestinian Authority, organizations that have split with Al-Qaeda or are still under its command, suicide volunteers, and multi-talented and resourceful intelligence networks. This is not to mention Hezbollah which has a structural relationship with Syria despite its primary loyalty to Iran. Damascus does not mind if Lebanon became an Iranian base through Hezbollah but it prefers to have its own quasi-independent influence if possible, although this may no longer be possible. This all adds to the anxiety revealed by the silence of the Syrian leadership while it puts on a face of confidence and calm.

It is not likely that understanding the Arab messages, responding to them, and accepting the appeals to free Lebanon and let it return to the Arab circle will help break the Syrian mindset. This mindset will probably be broken by the mistakes the Syrian leadership may commit. On this account, this leadership has quite a terrible record of "accomplishments," especially when it insisted on amending the Lebanese Constitution to extend former President Emil Lahoud's term eventually leading to Security Council Resolution 1559, which in return forced Syria to withdraw its troops out of Lebanon. Then there was the assumption that preventing the Lebanese parliament from convening to ratify the tribunal agreement with the United Nations would abort the tribunal. Owing to this error, the tribunal was formed under a binding Security Council Resolution at a time when the Syrian leadership committed another blunder by assuming that Russia would veto such a resolution.

What some Arab leaders are trying to do is to prove their resilience and seriousness over the Lebanese issue when talking with the Syrian leadership or when talking about Syria with influential international governments. These leaders want to highlight the centrality of the Lebanese question in regional considerations. In this, they are assisted by the clarity of international attitudes and weakened by the frailty that affects a few international players, such as France and its foreign minister Bernard Kouchner. Yet, the main problem facing these leaders, as one Arab official put it, is: if the Syrians put out, what is in it for them? And if they did not, what do we do? This is exactly what controls the tough talk with Syria on the Arab, international and American levels. The tribunal is obviously out of the trading equation. Only Washington is obviously capable of taking actions, since it possesses the means to issue serious threats against Damascus if the latter persisted with its intransigent policies.

Washington is not independent from the Israeli decision when it comes to Damascus, and this keeps it tied. On the other hand, there are growing indicators of differences between the American and Israeli agendas over Lebanon. There are those who read between the lines of recent developments and see preparations for upcoming battles in the region through the Lebanese gate. Some of these battles may be in the form of a new quality war between Israel and Hezbollah, while others may be related to Syria's relationship with the organizations it hosts, sponsors or uses on Syrian as well as on Lebanese territories.

Some Arabs warn Tehran and Damascus that their continued provocation and explosive policy in Lebanon will have negative consequences for Syria, Iran and their allies in Lebanon. They are warning Damascus that its excesses may eventually undermine its own interests, and they are telling Tehran that they are opposed to an American or Israeli military strike against Iran but that the ongoing actions in Lebanon and Palestine may eventually trigger such a strike. Just as the Arabs want presidential elections in Lebanon, they also want Gaza back to the Palestinian Authority, even if at least by form, and they know that the keys to this lie in the hands of Damascus and Tehran. However, not all keys are controlled by Iranian, Syrian and Israeli wills and plans with the presence of a reassuring popular will and unusual leaders in the Arab world, Lebanon being a case in point despite all the dangers and difficulties.

The million-plus demonstrators who took to the streets on Hariri's third anniversary gave life and determination to preventing the abortion of the unique democratic path in the Arab world. It is a new delegation by the people to the state, the government headed by Fouad Siniora, the parliamentary majority, and the pro-government leaderships which refuse to allow the rule of pro-Damascus and pro-Tehran militias from taking over no matter how much of a Lebanese identity they claim to have. It is reassuring to find Shiite leaders in Lebanon who are willing to raise their voice and make it clear to Hezbollah that it has no right to dominate and control the Lebanese Shiite voice that remains independent from Iran, even if these leaders have not organized themselves to break this dominance. In the past, nations in the region were taken by the terror of intelligence rule. Today, there are indicators that intelligence apparatuses are in a state of decline and that those who have built their glory through these apparatuses are now living in a state of fear and terror.