Amnesty Program a Qualified Success: Earlier this month, Israel removed 32 members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Fatah's military wing, from its list of wanted men, and has extended a probation period for 220 additional men. This move was part of an agreement Israel and the Palestinian Authority entered into in July, which provides a mechanism – based on behavior during a probation period – by which militants could be removed from Israel's lists of individuals to be arrested or assassinated.

At the beginning of the probation period, the men signed a document obligating them to refrain from taking part in any military activity, surrendered their weapons to the PA, and accepted a series of restrictions on their activity.

In November, three months after the start of the program, a statement issued by Israel's General Security Service announced that "the results of the amnesty deal indicate a change on the ground and we are seeing that some of the militants are indeed abandoning the path of terror." Last week, a report issued by the typically-hawkish Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) found that the second three-month phase of this program "concluded successfully with most of the wanted men, upwards of 200, fulfilling its requirements… While a number of exceptions – marginal in their extent – were identified in the process, the decisive majority of wanted men in the program stayed moderate and met their conditions. In parallel, the atmosphere that was created in the West Bank contributed to a general drop in the number of terror attacks and in their gravity, including among terrorists that were not included in the agreement." This change in the behavior of those not covered by the program is attributed to "a positive dynamic that was established following [the agreement]." 

The ITIC report also found that "the contribution of the PA's security services to the success of the program was limited. The success of this phase comes principally from the motivation of the wanted men in the program to improve their personal standing by returning to the routine of civilian life."

Speaking about the amnesty program, Knesset Member Avshalom Vilan said that removing the al-Aqsa members from Israel's list of wanted men was "the right thing at the right time," adding that Israel "must work to strengthen the moderate [Palestinian] forces and fight the fundamentalists." Palestinian officials, however, expressed disappointment over the limited number of wanted men in the program. "Israel is aware that all of the wanted al-Aqsa members have stopped engaging in any activity that could even come close to threatening the Jewish state, but the Israelis chose to exclude a number of wanted men they want to use as bargaining chips in future negotiations with us," one PA official told Ynet. (Ynet, 11/13/07 & 2/10/08; ITIC, 2/11/08)

Rethinking Roadblocks: At a conference sponsored by the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem on Wednesday, Israeli military experts presented an alternative to Israel's current use of roadblocks in the West Bank. The alternative was formulated by a team that comprised of senior reserve officers in the IDF, including former heads of Military Intelligence and the Civil Administration, as well as division, brigade, and battalion commanders. Its recommendations were sent to Defense Minister Ehud Barak.

In their presentation, the officers argued that while West Bank checkpoints prevent terror attacks in the short term, they also motivate terror. The officers suggested that reducing the number of checkpoints – which now stands at 550 – could help calm the atmosphere in the West Bank and undermine the status of Hamas in Gaza.

Their alternative plan is based on a system of roving roadblocks, a rear defense line adjacent to the Green Line, better protective measures on the roads used by Israelis, and improved coordination with the Palestinian security forces

In meetings with Barak and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Sunday, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner voiced similar concerns. He said that the number of West Bank checkpoints "intensifies the desperation and frustration of the Palestinians."

Israel is under particular pressure these days to ease the checkpoints around the city of Nablus, where Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has worked to wrest control from militias, getting local Hamas activists to commit to obey the law and seeing to it that only police officers carry weapons.

Palestinian negotiators reportedly raise the situation in Nablus in every meeting with their Israeli counterparts, asking for movement in and out of the city to be eased. They warn that Abbas' credibility will be increasingly harmed if the 170,000 residents of Nablus don't see improvements soon. "As long as the Israelis keep doing business as usual in Nablus, this will ultimately undermine all the efforts of the Palestinian security," said Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat.

Earlier this month former British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited the city, where he commented that "the weight of the occupation is very heavy here." He added that the PA is meeting its Road Map obligation to disarm militias, and that "It's important that this has a response from Israel, with respect to its obligations."

Yet, Israel is reluctant to ease its hold on the city and its troops often enter the city to search for suspects. On Tuesday, seven moneychangers in the city were targeted, where Israel seized cash the IDF said was earmarked for militants. IDF Captain Noa Meir explained that Nablus "contains some of the most advanced and dangerous terrorist infrastructure." She told reporters that Israel discovered 14 explosives labs in Nablus in 2007 and 58 bombs, and that earlier this month troops found rocket-making materials. (Haaretz, 2/14 & 2/18/08; Ynet 2/14/08)

Settling Outside the Law: 44 of Israel's 122 West Bank settlements were built on land confiscated from private Palestinian owners on "security" grounds, including 19 that were erected after the Israeli High Court of Justice banned such seizures in 1979.

These figures were published Sunday following a legal petition by Peace Now to compel the Defense Ministry to release the information under Israel's Freedom of Information Act.

Attorney Michael Sfard told Haaretz that the data "proves that systematic land theft for the purpose of establishing settlements was carried out via a fictitious and completely illegal use of the term 'military necessity.'"

Peace Now's Hagit Ofran wrote that it is "difficult to find a military or security official that would claim today that these settlements contribute to the security of the country. In fact the opposite has occurred: the settlements are a heavy burden on the army that has to invest much manpower and financial means into securing them and constructing easy access infrastructure."

Meanwhile, Israel Radio reported Sunday that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's instruction to freeze settlement construction was not being strictly enforced and that hundreds of residential units are under construction. Even in places where the freeze appeared to be in force – like at the former military base of Maskiyot in the Jodan Valley – ten families have been squatting for nearly a week and are requesting that Defense Minister Ehud Barak retroactively approve their stay. (Peace Now, 2/17/0;, Haaretz, 2/17/0;, International Herald Tribune, 2/17/08; Israel Radio, 2/15/08)

Exit Strategy Needed: Retired IDF Major General and former National Security Advisor Giora Eiland writes in Yedioth Ahronoth on Wednesday that Israel won't succeed in defeating Hamas or stopping rocket fire from Gaza unless Hamas has an exit strategy.

Eiland posits three assumptions that must be understood in formulating a policy. "Ignoring them or some of them will lead to erroneous decisions," he cautions.

First, "there is no direct response to the Kassam rocket fire and there is unlikely ever to be one. None of the Air Force strikes, successful as they may be, can stop the rocket fire (just as they did not stop the Katyusha rocket fire from Lebanon). There are only two ways to stop this fire, and both are indirect: either by taking over the territory or by getting those doing the firing not to want to fire."

Second, it is no longer "possible to defeat another side unconditionally (like [it was] in World War II). Even when it seems that there is such an absolute victory, as it appeared to the Americans in Iraq in the spring of 2003, this is a mirage. It takes the enemy a short time to reorganize and to continue the war by other means."

Third, "it is impossible to prevent arms smuggling from Egypt to Gaza as long as the border between them is based on Philadelphi Road, and it is immaterial who the force there is or what their motivation is. The reason is simple: Philadelphi Road is a paved road that bisects the city of Rafah into two parts—one in Egypt and one in Gaza. The residents on both sides are one family, and the distance between the houses on one side and those on the other side amounts to a few dozen meters. The ability to smuggle weapons will remain in place as long as this is the geography and the demography."

Israel should not "launch a campaign against Hamas with the declared goal being to bring about its fall from power," warns Eiland. "That simply can't happen. As long as this is the goal, there is no chance in the world that Hamas will agree to cooperate and to surrender, and therefore it will also not stop its Kassam rocket fire.  The second thing we don't do is to declare that we will not make any arrangement with Hamas as long as it does not accept the Quartet's terms (forswear terror, recognize Israel and recognize previous agreements). That also won't happen, because that would be a sort of surrender—and will therefore not take place."

What does Eiland suggest: "Military pressure, like civilian pressure, is effective as long as at the end, they give Hamas a dignified exit. Such an exit could a proposal by a third party (not American) that will bring the three sides (Israel, Hamas and Egypt) to an arrangement (de facto, not a diplomatic agreement). The arrangement would be comprised of four parts: a full cease-fire in Gaza and its environs; a prisoner exchange; Israel would again provide the normal quantities of fuel and electricity; Egypt would agree to establish in its territory a security zone west of Egyptian Rafah—a zone that only its establishment would make it possible to stop the smuggling to Gaza."  (Yedioth Ahronoth, 2/13/08)

Tunnel Vision: Israeli pundits are increasingly voicing their criticism of a potential large-scale Israeli operation in Gaza.

In Ma'ariv, Ofer Shelah attributes the paucity of options being considered by Israel's political leadership to the extent to which so many of Israel's leaders have long experience in commando-style military operations. He recalls that former Israeli National Security Advisor Uzi Dayan once commented that "When all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail." Shelah suggest that when the top Israeli echelon convenes, "a lot of people sit at the table and hold an absolutely identical hammer." Shelah adds that "'Tunnel vision,' is the way army people describe the GSS in recent years... In the view of those in uniform, the lives of those who have a defined task— to prevent terror—are relatively easy: they focuses on this, and to hell with the broader ramifications of their actions. When the top Israeli echelon convenes, many people sit at the table and look at the world through a tunnel."

Renowned novelist Amos Oz warns that "Israel must not fall into the trap that Hamas is laying for us and march into Gaza…  Occupying Gaza will not necessarily put an end to the Kassam rocket fire on Sderot and its environs. It addition to the attacks on Sderot, the occupying forces will also come under attack daily—with roadside bombs, shooting attacks and terrible suicide bombings. And more: invading Gaza will unite the masses of Palestinians and the Arab world and the Muslim world around Hamas, which is now isolated and despised by a majority of the Arabs.  By having Israeli troops invade Gaza, Hamas fighters will be depicted in the eyes of the Palestinians, in the eyes of the Arab world and in the eyes of world public opinion as the Palestinian Masada—the few against the many, residential neighborhoods against a regular army, refugee camps against bomber planes, boys against tanks, David against Goliath.  As the rulers of Gaza, we will be sitting on a can of worms. The occupying force will not have a single quiet day. Nor will Sderot and its environs."

Oz adds that "Even at these moments of rage, as our hearts go out to the continuous suffering of the residents of Sderot and its environs, we must not forget that the root of the Gaza problem is that hundreds of thousands of people are rotting there in refugee camps, camps that are hotbeds of poverty and despair, ignorance, religious and national zealotry, hatred and violence. From an historical perspective, there is no answer to the Gaza problem without there being, at least on the horizon, a degree of hope for these desperate people. What can be done now? It is possible and crucial to reach a cease-fire with Hamas in Gaza. A cease-fire like this has a difficult political price, of course. But of all the prices that Israel is liable to pay for an erroneous and hasty decision, this is the least fatal and most tolerable decision."

Haaretz columnist Yoel Marcus took Israeli President Shimon Peres to task for his comment that "If they fire at us, we have to hit back without hesitation. If they shoot at Israel, let them not be surprised when they get shot at." Marcus wrote that "Maybe it's his age. He seems to have forgotten he's president already and the time for populist sloganeering is over. And there is no military solution for Gaza, except for a price that Israeli society is no longer willing to pay. As Israel approaches its 60th birthday, the public mindset has changed. Israelis have stopped believing in victories, with or without quotation marks, for which scores of people have to die. The large-scale operation in Gaza that the generals are talking about is like riding a tiger. It's easy to climb on, but hard to climb off without getting battered and bruised. There is no way to stop the Qassam rockets by force. Massive military incursions are not the answer, and neither are targeted assassinations. [Hamas leader] Sheikh Yassin was assassinated. So was that the end of Hamas? Did terror stop? Forget sanctions against the civilian population. Forget power cuts. Forget striking down their firstborn. Talk to Hamas. No one ever died from dialogue."(Haaretz, 2/15/08; Ma'ariv, 2/15/08; Yedioth Ahronoth, 2/13/08)